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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the background and problem discussion providing the basis on which 
the purpose of the study is built and the research questions defined. Delimitations and a 
short thesis outline are also presented. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
A little over 15 years ago, 10 December 1999, CEO Wim Dik of Dutch telecom company 
KPN was glowing with confidence at the presentation of the billion-euro acquisition of 
German telecom company E-Plus, at that time the biggest acquisition in the history of The 
Netherlands. Earlier that year he had proclaimed a number of times that KPN should be 
present in the top-3 of telecom companies in Europe. At the day of the presentation, Wim Dik 
confidently stated the following: “In recent times it has been written that KPN would be too 
small for this kind of deal. However, we haven‟t been snoring on the beach the last couple of 
months.”(Dagblad Trouw, Economic Press, 1999) 
 
It goes without saying that Wim Dik was expecting a positive outcome of the deal, believing 
it to increase shareholder value. Truth be told, at time of the acquisition the Wim Dik wasn‟t 
the only one: The deal made sense to most industry experts. Expansion into the German 
market offered high growth opportunities, with at that time less than 1 in 4 Germans owning a 
mobile phone. With E-Plus‟ country-wide network already in place, there shouldn‟t be a too 
high of a need for extra investments. It seemed as if KPN had acquired a potential cash cow. 
The rationale behind the acquisition was that E-Plus would enable KPN to accelerate growth 
and increase the possibilities for future acquisitions (de Rooij, 2013). 
 
Little did people involved with the deal realize that two years later the dot-com bubble would 
burst. Not only was KPN heavily indebted at this time with a debt of over 23 billion euros, 
five times of what it was before the acquisition of E-Plus, moreover KPN had strongly 
overvalued E-Plus at time of the acquisition. In 2002 KPN decided to write down 13.7 billion 
on their acquisition. With short-term loans needing to be repaid and a decreased credit-risk 
rating from Moody‟s, KPN was barely able to avoid bankruptcy (Meinema, 2013).  
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On 2 October 2013 E-Plus was sold to Spanish telecom company Telefónica for 5 billion euro 
in cash and a 20 percent stake in Telefónica Deutschland. This resulted in a total value of 
around 8.55 billion, less than half of the 18.5 billion (41 billion guilders) paid 14 years earlier. 
Although E-Plus developed itself from the 4
th
 to the 2
nd
 biggest player in the German telecom 
market and became KPN‟s most profitable daughter firm, being responsible for over a quarter 
of KPN‟s revenues and profits, KPN was forced to sell its crown jewel. According to KPN, 
the rationale for selling off E-Plus was a further focus on the Dutch and Belgium market. 
Besides this the sale of E-Plus provided KPN with more financial flexibility, taking into 
account the high debt-burden still present within KPN, caused by the acquisition itself back in 
1999. Labelled by many as the most disastrous acquisition in the history of The Netherlands, 
the question arises what it is that makes some cross-border acquisitions successful, whereas 
other acquisitions fail to add value or even worse bring a company to the verge of going 
bankrupt (Meinema, 2013).  
 
With the Netherlands having come out of the recession in the third quarter of 2013 
(Eigenraam, 2014), and  the World Bank (Reuters, 2014) raising its forecast for global 
economic growth for the first time in 
three years, there has been a lot of 
optimism among consumers, corporate 
officers, economists and researchers 
lately. Consequently, the most recent 
CFO Survey by Deloitte the 
Netherlands, published in the fourth 
quarter of 2013, showed a positive 
outlook by Dutch CFOs over the next 
12 months (See Figure 1). No less than 
86% of CFOs expect an increase in 
private equity activity in the next 12 months, equaling 2011 Q1‟s highest level. Furthermore, 
92% of CFOs expect corporate M&A to increase in the next 12 months, with 41% of them 
expecting their companies to make an acquisition (Deloitte Research & Market Intelligence, 
2013). 
 
With Dutch M&A activity expected to increase, and little possibilities for growth in the 
Figure 1.1 Percentage of CFOs who expect M&A activity to 
increase/decrease in The Netherlands the next 12 months 
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relatively small Dutch market, Dutch companies need to look outside of their country‟s border 
for acquisitions. With the expected ongoing process of integration in the European market in 
which most Dutch-based acquisitions take place (Moschieri & Campa, 2013), increased 
knowledge on factors affecting the probability of success in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions initiated by Dutch companies are becoming increasingly relevant.  
 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
 
Cross-border M&As have been increasing over the last decades. According to UNCTAD
2
 
(2013), global cross-border M&A value has risen from $49.8 billion in 1987 to a record high 
of $1.02 trillion in 2007, whereas global M&A value in 2012 amounted to over 300 billion, 
and is expected to increase over the coming years with the global economy coming out of the 
financial crisis (World Bank, 2014).  
 
Research by Grant Thornton (2013) also found that more and more companies decide to 
participate in cross-border acquisitions. Since 2008 the percentage of cross-border 
acquisitions as part of total acquisitions has increased by 56 percent, with an 18 percent 
increase in 2012 alone. On a global scale, 28 percent of all companies expect to participate in 
mergers and acquisitions in the coming three years. With 55 percent, this percentage is even 
higher in The Netherlands, out of which Dutch executives expect more than half to be cross-
border deals. So why is it that companies decide to participate M&A, and more particular in 
cross-border acquisitions? 
 
The starting point for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions is the same: Two firms will 
merge when combining them increases the value (or utility) from the perception of the 
acquiring firm‟s manager (Erel et all, 2011). According to Gaughan (2007) many motives 
prompt executives to acquire or merge with other organizations, growth and synergy being the 
most frequently mentioned. Other value-adding motives discussed are diversification, tax 
benefits and increased market power, among others.  
 
Besides these general incentives to participate in M&A, additional benefits from cross-border 
as compared to domestic acquisitions make that an increasing amount of acquisitions take 
                                                 
2
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
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place across borders. Among those are governance-related differences, imperfect integration 
of capital markets, geographic expansion, limited domestic growth opportunities, the 
possibility of being able to exploit intangible assets in a number of markets and a more 
dynamic learning process (Danbolt and Maciver, 2012). 
 
However, the literature is conflicting, with different arguments and evidence put forward as to 
whether cross-border acquisitions can be expected to create or destroy value, and whether the 
wealth effects of cross-border acquisitions will be greater or smaller than in domestic 
acquisitions (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005, Feito-Ruiz and 
Menendez-Requejo, 2011; Danbolt and Maciver, 2012). Moreover, in spite of the vast amount 
of research on value creation through cross-border M&A, most of it focuses on the US and 
UK market (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Black et al., 2007; Francis et al., 2008; Danbolt 
and Maciver, 2012). To our knowledge, research on cross-border M&A by Dutch companies 
in specific has been limited to that of Corhay and Tourani Rad (2000), which researched the 
wealth effects of cross-border acquisitions by Dutch companies over the period 1990-1996. 
However, this research was limited to explaining for value creation by only taking into 
account size, relatedness, and international exposure. Furthermore, the results of this research 
are expected to be outdated, since Europe has changed significantly since the period 1990-
1996. According to Campa and Hernando (2004), the integration of the national economies, 
the increase in deregulation of a large number of economic sectors and the recent listing of 
large European corporations previously controlled by their national governments have 
decreased the cost of making corporate acquisitions and transactions across European borders. 
This has strongly facilitated and influenced the restructuring of the European corporate sector. 
Furthermore, the introduction of the Euro as the single currency further increased the liquidity 
of the European capital market. Besides this, harmonization of M&A regulations across the 
EU members decreased transaction costs, thus further liquidizing the M&A market 
(Moschieri & Campa, 2013).   
 
Summarizing, the research gap exists in the fact that although research on value-creation 
through European cross-border M&A has been increasing (Campa and Hernando, 2004; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2011) most of the research has been focusing on the US and UK 
market. More importantly, studies on the Dutch M&A market is restricted to the research by 
Corhay and Tourani Rad (2000) which is outdated and only focuses on threevalue drivers, not 
accounting for other possible determinants of value-creation which have been identified in the 
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existing literature (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). Moreover, the M&A success rate has 
not changed in the 30 years since research on these topics began (Marks and Mirvis, 2011) 
which signals there is still a lot to be gained concerning this field of research.  
 
1.3 Purpose and Problem Statement 
 
Based on the previously identified research gap, the primary objective of this paper is to 
determine whether cross-border acquisitions provide positive cumulative abnormal returns for 
Dutch publicly trading companies. Besides focusing on whether acquiring companies abroad 
adds shareholder value for the acquiring firm, the aim of this paper will also be to determine 
those factors which significantly impact acquirer performance. Hypotheses will be formed 
based on existing theories on determinants for M&A success, which subsequently will be 
applied to the Dutch company setting. Taking into account the current developments and 
expectations in the Dutch M&A market, with more than half of acquisitions being expected to 
be cross-border, the aim is to provide Dutch executives with a framework which can help 
them to improve cross-border acquisition success. By executing deals with those factors 
which have been proven to positively affect Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), and 
consequently forgoing deals with factors expected to negatively affect CAR, the aim of this 
paper is to help Dutch companies to improve their cross-border M&A success rate, making 
our paper not only theoretically, but also practically relevant. 
 
Factors affecting cross-border M&A success we will be focusing on in our research are 
cultural difference, GDP growth rate difference, tax rate difference, relative deal size, method 
of payment, legal status of target firm, corporate control and diversification. 
 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
 
This study will only focus on CAR for acquiring firms in cross-border acquisitions, since the 
evidence on CAR for target firms has been found to be unequivocal, finding positive CAR in 
the range of 20-30 percent (Campa and Hernando, 2004). Furthermore this study will only 
take into account acquiring firms which are publicly trading, and only those acquisitions 
which are of significant size to be expected to affect value for the acquiring firm‟s 
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shareholders. Furthermore, as a consequence of using the market study method in this study, 
this study is limited to publicly trading companies and leaves out Dutch private companies 
involved in Cross-Border M&A 
 
To guarantee a sufficient sample size from individual countries, only those countries from 
which at least 10 acquisitions were made are included. Consequently, the countries involved 
in this study are: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom and United States of America. Together these countries make for 89 
percent of total deals. 
 
In this paper, an event study will be used to asses CAR, which assumes that the capital market 
accurately reflects the implication of an announced event for the firm in question. On the 
short-term however, some developments are hard to anticipate on (For example the bursting 
of the Dot.com bubble as discussed in the background section) which can lead to very 
different results in CAR depending on choosing either a short term or long term window.  
 
1.5 Audience 
 
The main audience for this study is practitioners at Dutch publicly trading companies 
involved in cross-border acquisitions, as well as practitioners in cross-border M&A based in 
other countries. Although this study is focused on acquirers from developed markets and 
targets from developed and developing markets, the results might still apply to other markets 
since hypotheses in this study were formed and tested based on finance theories and empirical 
results from different markets. Furthermore, this study is also relevant for students and 
academics interested in the research of corporate finance and more specifically in mergers and 
acquisitions. 
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 1.6 Thesis Outline 
 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into the following four chapters 
 
Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework  
This chapter provides an overview of previous literature on M&A and Cross-Border M&A in 
specific, as means to provide the reader with a theoretical framework used in the rest of this 
study. Motivation for M&A, additional challenges and opportunities in cross-border M&A 
and determinants affecting Cross-Border M&A are all discussed, as well as value-creation in 
M&A. The chapter concludes with a comparison of value-creation between domestic- and 
cross-border M&A followed by a literature review in which all preceding literature is 
summarized and critically discussed.    
 
Chapter 3 - Methodology 
This chapter begins by providing the reader an idea about the common research methods used 
for similar topics. Then detailed description of analytical framework and justification for 
choosing the framework is provided. The procedure of the sample selection is described in 
detail as well as the sources, followed by the brief descriptions of the dependent variable and 
explanatory variables. Within the variables, hypotheses are formed based on theory and 
previous empirical findings, which will be tested with later relevant tests. The chapter ends 
with the justification supporting reliability and validity of methodology and data. 
 
Chapter 4 – Empirical Findings & Analysis  
This chapter starts with describing the sample statistics. After this the reader is provided the 
empirical findings of this study on both the hypothesis concerning the dependent variable as 
well as the hypotheses on the independent variables. Simultaneously, the chapter provides 
analysis and interpretation of the empirical results.   
 
Chapter 5 – Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research 
The study concludes with the overall conclusion of our study as well as suggestions for 
further research. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter provides an overview of previous literature on M&A and Cross-Border M&A in 
specific, as means to provide the reader with a theoretical framework which will be used in 
the rest of this study. 
 
 
2.1 Motivation for M&A 
 
2.1.1 M&A Motivated by Value-Creation 
 
Whether it concerns a domestic or cross-border acquisition, the overarching reason for 
participating in a merger or acquisition with another organization is that the union will enable 
a firm to attain strategic goals more quickly and inexpensively than if a company would strive 
to attain the same results by itself.  
 
According to Gaughan (2007) many motives prompt executives to acquire or merge with 
other organizations, growth and synergy being the most frequently mentioned. Other value-
adding motives discussed are diversification, tax benefits and increased market power, among 
others. 
 
More recently, in a global survey conducted in 2013 by KPMG, over 1000 M&A experts 
believed that the main reasons to initiate a deal in 2014, beyond increasing revenues or cutting 
costs, is to introduce new products, enter into new lines of business, expand geographic reach, 
expand customer base and opportunism due to for example the sudden availability of a target 
(KPMG, 2013). What springs out is that most of these motives seem to focus on cross-border 
acquisitions. 
 
2.1.2 Other Motivations for M&A  
 
Besides the above mentioned cases in which the decision to acquire or merge with another 
company is motivated by strategic intent, the literature also extensively discusses those cases 
in which hubris (Roll, 1986), agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and herding 
(Devenow and Welch, 1996) are found to influence the decision to engage in M&As.  
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Manager hubris 
The hubris hypothesis implies that managers seek to acquire firms for their own personal 
motives and that the pure economic gains to the acquiring firm are not the sole motivation or 
even the primary motivation in the acquisition (Gaughan, 2007). Instead, overconfident 
managers overestimate the creation of synergetic value and are likely to overestimate their 
abilities to manage an acquisition, caused by excessive confidence, arrogance and pride (Roll, 
1986).  
 
Herding 
Devenow and Welch (1996) describe herding as the belief that investors are influenced by the 
decisions of other investors. It is built on the idea that imitation and mimicry are amongst the 
most basic human instincts. Consequently, this can lead to sub-optimal acquisition decisions 
instead of the best aggregate choice. They argue that herding can be closely linked to the 
existence of bubbles, with managers not wanting to miss out on possible opportunities seen by 
the rest of the market. The first successful takeovers encourage other companies to undertake 
similar transactions. 
 
Agency problems 
Frequently mentioned agency problems, surfacing as a result of poor corporate governance, 
are empire-building and diversification. In the case of empire building, managers have a large 
amount of excess cash at their disposal. Self-interested managers, instead of returning the 
excess cash to their shareholders, choose for empire building instead. The excess cash makes 
it possible for managers to make poor acquisitions when they have run out of good ones 
(Jensen, 1986; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Besides empire building, in some cases 
managers are suspected to participate in M&A in order to decrease their companies‟ earnings 
volatility, which enhances corporate survival and protects their own positions (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981). Lastly, empirical evidence has shown that rewards to top managers are driven by 
firm size rather than by performance, and as such this forms an extra incentive for managers 
to put their own interests before their shareholders‟ (Schmidt and Fowler, 1990). 
 
M&A Failure 
Often, the deals that fail to create value or even destroy value are motivated by one of these 
three above mentioned reasons: Hubris, herding and managerial self-interest enabled by 
agency problems. When companies engage in acquisitions motivated by one of these three 
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reasons, the reasons for eventually failing to create value are buying the wrong company, 
making the deal at the wrong time, or paying the wrong price (Mark and Mirvis, 2011). The 
latter is often explained to be the result of the winner’s curse, the hypothesis which states that 
bidders who overestimate the value of a target will most likely win a bidding. According to 
this hypothesis, the reason they win the bidding is because they outbid rivals who more 
accurately value the target (Baserman and Samuelson, 1983).  Furthermore, through a 30 year 
research program, evidence showed that the processes used to put companies together are 
integral to a deal‟s success versus failure, which encompasses the formation and operations of 
the buying team, how the firms are integrated, and learning from current deals to better 
manage future ones (Marks and Mirvis, 2010). Additionally, Hitt et al. (1998) found that high 
or extraordinary debt played an important role in the lack of success in 21 of the 24 
acquisitions they studied. 
 
Although the preceding is true for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, the latter 
differentiates itself from domestic acquisitions through a number of unique challenges and 
opportunities.  
 
2.2 Additional Challenges and Opportunities in Cross-Border M&As 
 
The dynamics of cross-border M&A are largely similar to those of domestic M&A. However, 
due to their international nature, they also offer some additional opportunities which motivate 
to participate in cross-border M&A, and involve unique challenges which also need to be 
taken into consideration. In this paragraph the focus will be on international factors affecting 
value in M&As. In the following paragraph, deal- and firm specific factors will be considered 
as well. 
 
2.2.1 Challenges in Cross-Border M&As 
 
Two frequently mentioned challenges in cross-border M&A are double-layered acculturation 
(Barkema et al., 1996) and liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), both negatively affecting 
the value-creation in cross-border acquisitions.   
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Liability of Foreignness 
To start with the latter, Zaheer (1995) describes liability of foreignness (LOF) as all additional 
costs a firm operating in a market overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur, and 
focuses on the following four sources of these costs:  
 
1 Costs directly associated with spatial distance, such as the costs of travel, 
transportation, and coordination over distance and across time zones. 
2 Firm-specific costs based on a particular company‟s unfamiliarity with and lack of 
roots in a local environment. 
3 Costs resulting from the host country environment, such as the lack of legitimacy of 
foreign firms and economic nationalism. 
4 Costs from the home country environment, such as the restrictions on high-technology 
sales to certain countries. 
 
Eden and Miller (2004) extended the research on LOF by defining it as the key component of 
the cost of doing business abroad (CDBA). They separate CDBA into two major categories: 
economic market-based activity costs and LOF.  
 
1. Activity-Based Costs 
These economic costs include transportation and communications costs, trade barriers (tariffs, 
entry and license fees) and costs associated with foreign exchange transactions, all costs not 
faced by a local firm in the host country. They are overwhelmingly economic, driven by 
geographic distance and can be anticipated and quantified.  
 
2. Liability of Foreignness  
Eden and Miller (2004) describe this as being a stranger in a strange land. Zaheer (2002), 
building on her earlier study mentioned above from 1995, argues that LOF can be 
decomposed into three hazards that affect foreign firms disproportionately to local firms in the 
host country. 
 
i. Unfamiliarity Hazards 
These reflect the lack of knowledge or experience in the host country, which places 
the foreign firm at a disadvantage compared to local firms. A shorter presence in the 
host country causes unfamiliarity hazards, which are measured by the additional costs 
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that companies must incur to achieve the same level of host-market knowledge as a 
local firm (Zaheer, 2002). 
 
ii. Discrimination Hazards 
This is defined as the discriminatory treatment inflicted on the foreign firm relative to 
local firms in the host country, and can arise from differential treatment by the host 
governments, consumers or the general public in the host country (Zaheer, 2002). 
Eden and Miller (2004) describe it as the costs of the challenges of obtaining external 
legitimacy. Being treated as an outsider by consumers and the local politics can 
negatively affect the value-creation for foreign firms. 
 
iii. Relational Hazards  
These include costs associated with a foreign firm‟s network position in the host 
country and its linkages to important local actors, which are both likely to be less 
developed relative to those of a local firm. This results in poorer access to local 
information and resources (Zaheer 2002). 
 
Cultural Differences 
Another challenge when acquiring a company abroad concerns double-layered acculturation, 
which entails the combination of two companies with different organizational cultures that are 
embedded in different national cultures. In these situations the acquired company not only has 
to adapt to an unfamiliar organizational culture, but also to a new national culture. The 
inability to adjust to these new cultures has the potential to decrease the success of the 
acquisition (Barkema et al., 1996). However, the existing evidence on the effect of cultural 
difference between two countries on shareholder returns is divided. On the one hand it is 
argued that national cultural distance between firms tends to result in culture classes resulting 
into conflicts decreasing the value of the deal (Datta and Puia, 1995; Jemison and Sitkin, 
1986). On the other one hand it is argued that the national cultural distance improves cross-
border acquisition performance by providing access to the target‟s and the acquirer‟s diverse 
set of routines embedded in their respective national cultures (Hofstede, 1980; Kogut and 
Singh, 1988; Chakrabarti et al., 2009). 
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Summarized, differences in national culture, customer preferences, business practices, and 
institutional forces, such as government regulations, can hinder firms from fully realizing 
their strategic objectives. Uncertainty and information asymmetry in foreign markets make it 
difficult for firms to adjust and learn from both the local market and target firm, as countries 
have different economic, institutional and cultural structures (Shimizu et al, 2004). With these 
challenges present it is useful to also have a closer look at possible benefits derived from 
cross-border M&A. 
 
2.2.2 Opportunities in Cross-Border M&As 
 
A number of opportunities to create value exist in cross-border M&A in particular as 
compared to domestic M&A, such as country-level governance differences, differences in 
valuation in the form of relative currency increases and international tax differences.  
 
In a more general view on firms‟ motives to pursue international expansion, Madura (2012) 
proposes comparative advantage, product cycle, and imperfect markets as the main 
motivation for international expansion. 
 
Theory of Comparative Advantage 
This theory is built on the reasoning that specialization by countries can increase production 
efficiency, for example advantages in technology or labor costs. Since these advantages 
cannot be easily transported, countries tend to use their advantages to specialize in the 
production of goods that can be produced with relative efficiency. When a country decides to 
specialize in certain products or services, it may not be able produce other products 
efficiently, so trade between countries is essential. Summarized, comparative advantage 
motivates companies to expand abroad since it allows them to increase production efficiency.   
 
Product Cycle Theory 
According to this theory, firms become established in the home market as a result of some 
perceived advantage over existing competitors, such as a need by the market for at least one 
more supplier of the product. Foreign demand for the product will at first be accommodated 
by exporting. As time passes and competition grows, the firm may feel the only way to retain 
its advantage over competition in foreign countries is by producing the product in the foreign 
markets, thereby reducing its transportation costs. 
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Imperfect Markets Theory 
In a world with perfect capital markets, factors of production would be easily transferable, 
and labor and other resources would flow wherever they would be in demand. This 
unrestricted mobility of factors would create equality in costs and returns and remove the 
comparative cost advantage discussed before. However, in reality the market suffers from 
imperfect conditions where factors of production are immobile to a certain extent. Therefore, 
there are costs and restrictions related to the transfer of labor and other resources used for 
production. As a result, factors of production, exchange rates, tax rates and interest rates differ 
around the globe (Erel et al., 2012). Consequently, it pays off for companies to search for 
cross-border opportunities to acquire and take advantage of these imperfections. By actually 
acquiring companies in foreign markets, they are able to decrease the transaction costs 
normally involved in cross-border operations.  
 
Within the above mentioned school of thought of imperfect markets, there exist three 
competing theories trying to explain cross-border acquisitions also worth mentioning here: 
International diversification theory, internalization theory and exchange rate theory.  
 
1. International Diversification Theory 
Starting with the first, the international diversification theory states that the main motive for 
expanding operations into foreign countries is to take advantage of imperfections in the 
financial markets as described above, and by doing so maximize returns. Due to various 
governmental restrictions on the individual portfolio investment and because of information 
asymmetry on the part of the individual investor, corporate diversification is favored over 
individual diversification. Furthermore international diversification helps to reduce variability 
in earnings (Kohli and Mann, 2011). 
 
2. Internalization Theory 
According to this theory, the main motivation for expanding globally is to internalize 
intangible assets. The reason for this, according to Morck & Yeung (1991) is that these assets 
are based on the proprietary information and are difficult to organize externally. The value of 
these assets enhances in direct proportion to the scale of the company‟s operations, which in 
turn can be increased by increasing the number of markets in which it operates. As a result, 
companies strive to create avenues for optimum utilization of such assets by expanding 
abroad and taking over companies across the geographies (Kohli and Mann, 2011). At the 
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same time, recent international business literature has begun to consider a reverse-
internalization argument. The argument is that instead of pushing the home-country‟s 
technological and organizational advantages to the host-country, the acquirer pulls the assets 
of the target firm- which range from technical skills, to market understanding, to supplier 
relationships, to government ties- out of the host country. In this view, multinational 
corporations do not only exploit their current skills and expertise, but also profit from the 
target‟s advantages (Anand et al.,2005). 
 
3. Exchange Rate Theory 
This theory states that the value creation in cross-border acquisitions is influenced by frictions 
in the exchange rate markets. Erel et al. (2012) found that given the fact that markets in 
different countries are not perfectly integrated, this can also motivate cross-border 
acquisitions. Currency increases in the acquirer‟s home-country would make targets relatively 
inexpensive, leading to some potential acquisitions to be profitable that would not have been 
profitable under the old exchange rates. This form of opportunism can lead to value-
decreasing deals however, since deals are made pure because of the relative low price of the 
target, instead of looking at value-adding potential (Gaughan, 2007). 
 
Lastly existing literature on cross-border M&A also frequently mentions geographic reach 
and organizational learning, the market for corporate control and taxes as motives to 
participate in cross-border M&As, as well as factors influencing the value of those deals. 
 
Market for corporate control in target firm country 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the quality of legal protection of shareholders helps 
determine ownership concentration, accounting for the higher concentration of ownership in 
the French civil law countries (CIA Factbook, 2013).
3
 Their results support the idea that 
heavily concentrated ownership results from, and perhaps substitutes for, weak protection of 
investors in a corporate governance system. In that line of reasoning, higher ownership 
concentration in countries with poor shareholder protection is valuable and can be expected to 
increase acquiring shareholders‟ wealth gains. Chari et al. (2004) found evidence that the 
acquirer‟s returns increase significantly whenever a majority stake is transferred from the 
target to the acquiring firm. 
                                                 
3
 Most countries from the European Union, except for the UK, Ireland and Cyprus belong to this legal system. 
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Geographic Reach and Organizational Learning 
Anand et al. (2005) discuss location opportunities to gain access to geographically distributed 
knowledge. Foreign target firms, and especially those operating in multiple countries, provide 
immediate opportunities for extensive market expansion. In addition, such targets provide 
opportunities to gain new knowledge. Scholars focusing on the knowledge creation potential 
of the multinational firm stress the ability of foreign subsidiaries to generate innovations 
based on resources resident in the heterogeneous, host country environment (Kogut and 
Zander, 1995; Birkinshaw, 1997; Frost, 2001). Through their ongoing interaction with their 
host country environment, firms with greater multinational scope develop networks of 
relationships with universities, firms, suppliers and public agencies. According to Kostova 
and Zaheer (1999) participation in external networks in different countries provides firms 
with a greater capability to scan the environment, screen new technologies and ideas, gain 
access to local resources and leverage institutional contacts.   
 
Tax rate 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest that financial reasons could motivate mergers. Firms could 
be attracted by the opportunity to fully utilize tax shields, increase leverage, and exploit other 
tax advantages, with the last being most relevant in cross-border acquisitions. Coeurdacier et 
al. (2009) found in a study on the European market that a 10 percentage point decrease in the 
differential in effective average corporate taxes between target and acquiring countries would 
increase the outflows of manufacturing equity investment
4
 in the same sector by 68%, 
suggesting that changes in corporate taxes are an efficient tool to attract foreign capital. 
Manzon et al. (1994) found in a macroeconomic analysis of the different tax systems among 
different countries, focusing on the U.S. market, that if the target firm has a high-tax system, 
U.S. acquirers have higher abnormal returns than if they acquire a target from a low-tax 
country. However, Cakici et al. (1996) found that tax effects were not relevant as a factor 
explaining changes in wealth effects.  
 
As could be seen, cross-border acquisitions differ from domestic acquisitions in a number of 
significant ways, and as a consequence it is to be expected that value creation in both types of 
acquisitions have been found to differ as well. The remaining of this chapter will be used to 
review the existing literature on factors affecting value creation, both deal and company 
                                                 
4
 According to Hijzen et al. (2008), manufcaturing accounts for approximately 40 percent of cross-border 
acquirers and targets. 
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specific and evidence on value-creation through M&A. Lastly, the ability of both domestic 
M&A and cross-border M&A to generate returns for shareholders of the acquiring firm will 
be compared to one another, followed by a critical review and summary of the literature 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
2.3 Deal- and Company Specific Factors Affecting Value Creation in M&A 
 
Previous studies on M&A have shown that a variety of factors affect the takeover 
announcement returns. Both attributes of the M&A transaction and the characteristics of the 
bidding and target firm affect the value-creation for shareholders (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008; Jensen and Ruback, 1983).  
 
2.3.1 Takeover Characteristics 
 
According to Martynova and Renneboog (2011) several transaction attributes are likely to 
affect bidder‟s and target‟s takeover returns. Besides the geographical scope of the bid as 
discussed earlier in this paper the following attributes have been identified by existing 
literature on M&A to be affecting bidder‟s and target‟s returns: The form of and the attitude 
towards the deal, the legal status of the target firm, the industry relatedness of the bidding and 
target firm, the type of acquisition, the means of payment, deal transparency, and the timing 
of the takeover.  
 
Form and attitude towards the deal 
Hostile takeovers as well as opposed tender offers are frequently associated with lower 
takeover wealth effects to the bidder‟s shareholders (Franks and Mayer, 1996; Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). Goergen and Renneboog (2004) found that the abnormal return on the 
announcement day were 2.2% and 2.43% for mergers and unopposed acquisitions, 
respectively. However, on average, the bidder‟s shareholders received an abnormal negative 
return of 2.5% in hostile acquisitions. The rationale behind this is that when the target refuses 
the first offer, the premium that needs to be paid to provide the target with an acceptable offer 
would become too high for the acquisition to become successful. In the same way, for a 
bidding firm to acquire another company through a tender offer, often high premiums need to 
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be paid to make the bid successful. As a result, shareholders of the bidding company are 
afraid that the increased offer premium will erode any existing synergy gains. 
 
Legal status target firm 
The way in which the legal status of a firm affects the wealth effect for the bidder‟s 
shareholders differs. Bradley and Sundaram (2004) found evidence that acquisitions of private 
targets lead to a decrease in the takeover wealth since low disclosure requirements for 
privately held firms may lead to a higher information asymmetry. However, Faccio et al. 
(2006) found the opposite to be true reason being that the shares of privately-held firms are by 
definition illiquid, creating a price discount. Furthermore, takeover negotiations with the 
owners of private firms may have a better chance of succeeding than when a public tender 
offer has to be launched for a widely-held firm (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). 
 
Industry relatedness 
Diversification by companies through the acquisition of companies in unrelated industries, are 
expected to trigger lower takeover returns to the bidder‟s shareholders (Maquiera et al., 1998; 
Doukas et al., 2002). The fundamental argument made against unrelated diversification is that 
it increases agency problems. If managers tend to overinvest when the firm has excess cash, 
then access to an internal market for capital in a diversified firm simply provides a greater 
opportunity to overinvest (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). Furthermore, diversification may lead to 
decreased efficiency as a result of information asymmetry problems between the firm‟s 
central management and the management of the operating divisions. Although the existing 
research hints mostly to the idea unrelated diversification is value-destroying, a study on the 
Dutch market by Corhay and Tourani Rad (2000) found the exact opposite for Dutch firms. 
Their rationale for this counter-intuitive result is that the risk-reducing diversification effects 
of going into an unrelated business dominate the synergy effects of staying within the same 
industry. 
 
Type of acquisition 
Although receiving little attention in the existing literature (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011) 
partial acquisitions may be used by bidding firms as an instrument to transfer wealth from the 
target‟s minority shareholders to themselves, and in such a way increase the bidder‟s 
shareholder wealth. In their study, Martynova and Renneboog (2011) found lower returns 
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associated with partial acquisitions, reflecting concerns that a transfer of control will lead to 
expropriation of the remaining minority shareholders. 
 
Means of payment  
Evidence on the method of payment and its effect on value-creation is found to be mixed. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that shareholders of both the bidding- and target firm might 
interpret payment in stock as a signal that the bidder‟s shares are overpriced. At the same 
time, a cash offer is interpreted as a positive signal about the target firm‟s quality, as the 
bidding firm is buying out the target‟s shareholders and is hence not willing to share future 
value increases with them (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). While this holds for studies on 
the US market, studies on Canada and Europe provide a different result.  
 
Dutta et al. (2013) in their study on cross-border M&A on the Canadian market find that stock 
deals have important advantages such as monitoring by existing shareholders of the target 
firm, mitigating information asymmetry and corporate memory retention. This is in line with 
earlier findings on the Canadian market by Eckbo and Thorburn (2002). In a study on the 
European market, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) show that bidders‟ CAR in all-equity deals 
significantly exceed those in all-cash deals. A possible explanation for this is offered by 
Eckbo et al. (1990) who point out that all-cash payments require taxes on capital gains to be 
paid immediately by the target firm‟s shareholders. It is hypothesized that to compensate for 
this, bidders must raise the offer premium to compensate target shareholders for the tax 
penalty associated with this particular method of payment. All of this implies that the choice 
to make an all-equity offer does not per se suggest to the market that the bidder‟s equity is 
overvalued.  
 
However, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) only studied large deals. As an effect, a possible 
realization by the bidder‟s shareholders is that the company‟s choice of payment might be 
restricted, and as such is sometimes forced to make use of stock. A third possibility is a 
combined method of payment, a combination of both cash and stock. According to an 
empirical study by Eckbo et al (1990) payment through a combination of stock and cash 
offers more return than only cash and only stock deals. He argued that since two-sided 
information asymmetry affects both acquirer and target, a combination of stock and cash in 
the deal is more optimal. 
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Lack of deal transparency 
The lack of deal transparency has been found to negatively affect bidder‟s shareholders‟ 
returns. Such lack of information is expected to make investors pessimistic about the expected 
synergy value that accrues to the bidder. Also, the fact that their company has chosen to 
conceal some information makes investors concerned that the deal will be worse than their 
initial expectations. Martynova and Renneboog (2011) found significantly lower returns for 
deals in which deal information was undisclosed. The CAR for shareholders of the acquiring 
firm was found to be 5.57% lower on average than in those deals in which information was 
disclosed. 
 
Timing 
Takeover returns to the bidder‟s shareholders have been found to decline during and after 
takeover wave peaks. A great example of how this is able to happen is described by Gaughan 
(2007). In his book he narrates how in the period 1998-2001, at the peak of the 5
th
 merger 
wave, 87 deals lost over 1 billion dollars of its shareholders‟ money. During this time, hubris-
filled executives thought that these high valuations were the product of their managerial 
expertise rather than the fact that their company, and most of the market, was riding an 
irrational wave of overvaluation. As a result, it was hard for boards of companies to tell their 
CEO that his or her merger proposals were unsound and irresponsible, which lead to 
acquisitions taking place on the basis of manager hubris and managerial self-interest, instead 
of focusing solely on creating value for its shareholders.  
 
2.3.2 Firm Characteristics 
 
Firm characteristics mentioned by Martynova and Renneboog (2011) and Moeller et al. 
(2004) which are likely to have an impact on the wealth effects of bidder firm‟s shareholders 
are the bidder‟s firm size, leverage, cash flows, and the relative size of the target. 
 
Firm size acquirer 
Moeller et al. (2004) studied the effect of firm size on the wealth effect of shareholders in 
bidder firms. They found that acquiring-firm shareholders of relatively smaller firms received 
CAR of roughly two percentage point higher than larger firms
5
 Moeller et al. (2004) believe 
                                                 
5
 Defined as having market capitalization of over the 25
th
 percentile on the NYSE. 
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that larger acquirers tend to overpay in takeovers, and as such firm size can be considered as a 
proxy for managerial hubris (Roll, 1986). This is in line with more recent evidence found by 
Feito-Ruiz and Menendex-Requejo (2011). 
 
Cash flow and leverage 
The free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) implies that managers of firms with unused 
borrowing power and large free cash flows are more likely to undertake low-benefit or even 
value-destroying mergers. As such, higher free cash flows and lower leverage negatively 
affect shareholders of the bidding firms. However, high cash flow and low leverage at the 
target firm positively affect the bidder‟s shareholder wealth creation. (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008). 
 
Relative size of the target 
Evidence on the effects of relative size of the target is mixed. Some studies report positive 
effects of a relatively larger target size, which is argued to be caused by the fact that the larger 
the relative size of the target firm, the more information there will be available on it, and as a 
result of that fewer adverse selection problems when valuing it (Moeller and Schlingemann, 
2005; Feito-Ruiz and Menendex-Requejo, 2011). Others however argue that the larger the 
relative size of the target compared to the acquirer, the lower the expected bidder‟s 
shareholder returns. The rationale behind this is that larger firms generally require a more 
complex management structure to operate effectively, and as such the post-acquisition 
integration of a relatively large target may be a difficult and more costly process, negatively 
affecting possible synergy realizations (Hansen, 1987; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). 
 
2.4 Value Creation in M&A 
 
With the abundance of motives suggested by both practitioners and academics to participate 
in M&A, and with the number of M&A increasing the coming years, it appears that both 
acquirers and targets expect M&A to add value to their operations. Previous research however 
has not been conclusive on this matter and has shown differing results. The public consensus 
when reviewing literature which focuses on both domestic- and cross-border acquisitions as a 
whole seems to be that most mergers and acquisitions do not succeed in creating shareholder 
value for the acquiring firm‟s shareholders. According to Christensen et al (2011) a staggering 
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amount of between 70 percent and 90 percent fails to create value. Bauer and Matzler (2014) 
estimate the average failure rate lower, in between 40 percent and 60 percent, which is in line 
with failure rates up to 50 percent found by Craninckx and Huyghebaert (2011) in an intra-
European sample. In 2000, focusing on cross-border acquisitions in specific, KPMG found 
that 83 percent of all deals failed to deliver shareholder value, with 53 percent actually 
destroying value. Georgen and Renneboog (2004) focusing on Cross-Border M&A in Europe 
and studying 148 deals found 119 out of the total to be adding value for the acquirer firm‟s 
shareholders, resulting in a more optimistic success rate compared to the above studies, of 76 
percent. 
 
When reviewing the literature, a large number of scholars and practitioners come to a more 
positive conclusion, advocating the belief that mergers and acquisitions do add value to the 
target as well as the acquiring party.  
 
Campa and Hernando (2004) compared 13 studies on cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 
target firms with each other, and 15 studies on CAR for acquiring firms. 
 
Target Firm Shareholders’ Returns 
Target firm shareholders were found to receive CAR which were on average significantly 
positive in almost all cases, in the range of 20-30 percent. This is in line with previous 
research by Jensen and Ruback (1983), Datta et al. (1992) and Bruner (2001).  
 
Acquiring Firm Shareholders’ Returns 
The evidence found for acquiring firms‟ shareholders, based on 15 previous studies on CAR 
for buyer firms, is less conclusive. The evidence is evenly distributed between studies that 
report negative CAR and those that report zero and slightly positive CAR. Those studies that 
did report positive CAR consisted of very small positive CAR in most cases, especially when 
compared to the reported CAR to target firms. What needs to be stressed is that these findings 
for shareholder value at the acquiring firm are mostly based on returns around the 
announcement date. Studies that analyze long-term returns to shareholders of acquiring firms 
tend to find significantly negative CAR to acquirers. Aw and Chatterjee (2004) for example 
reported an average acquiring shareholder loss of about 12% up to two years following the 
deal announcement for a sample of 79 large UK acquirers during 1991-96. 
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Total value creation: Target and Acquirer Returns Combined 
Several studies have looked at the total value creation by combining the CAR of both 
shareholders of the acquiring- and target firm (Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Mulherin, 2000; 
Houston et al., 2001; Kuipers et al., 2002; Beitel et al., 2002; Aktas et al., 2001). Almost all 
of these studies report positive combined CAR, with only the study of Aktas et al. showing 
negative combined CAR in some cases depending on the event window chosen. For all cases 
in which there is a positive combined CAR found, they are relatively low, with a maximum of 
6% in all observations.  
 
When focusing solely on combined value creation in cross-border acquisitions the results are 
mixed, with both studies arguing value-creation (Doukas and Travlos, 1988; La Porta et al., 
2000) as well as value destruction (Denis et al, 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). 
However, studies on European M&A for periods following the 1990s show positive CAR in 
most cases (Antoniou et al., 2007; Conn et al., 2005; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). 
 
2.5 Comparing Value Creation in Domestic M&A and Cross-Border M&A 
 
As has been discussed earlier, both additional benefits and costs come into play when 
companies decide to acquire cross-border instead of domestic. This has led many researches 
to investigate possibly existing differences between domestic M&A on the one side and cross-
border on the other. Although the findings on this topic have been found to differ, more recent 
research suggests that both target and bidding company shareholders on average earn 
significantly higher abnormal returns in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions. This 
chapter is restricted to evaluating value-creation for shareholders of the acquiring firm, since 
that is what our study will focus on. 
  
Bidder returns in domestic and cross-border acquisitions compared 
There have been several studies comparing the performance of bidders in cross-border 
acquisitions to that of domestic acquirers which found domestic acquisitions to add more 
value compared to cross-border ones. In studies on the US market, Eckbo and Thorburn 
(2000) found US bidders to gain less than Canadian bidders in acquisitions of Canadian firms, 
and Starks and Wei (2004) found foreign bidders to gain less than US bidders in acquisitions 
of US firms. More generally, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) and Black et al. (2007) found 
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announcement returns to US bidders in cross-border acquisitions to be significantly lower 
than in domestic acquisitions. Although Francis et al. (2008) found the same results they also 
found that cross-border effects for US bidders turned insignificantly positive during the late 
1990s and early 2000s. More recent evidence argues an opposing view, having found 
significantly more positive returns for cross-border acquisitions compared to domestic deals. 
A study by Dutta et al. (2013), focusing on 1300 completed deals by Canadian acquirers in 
between 1993-2002, found that shareholders prefer cross-border acquisitions over domestic 
deals. Even though research on the US market is most extensive, our study will mainly look at 
acquisitions within Europe since that is where most acquisitions by Dutch firms have taken 
place over the years. 
 
In a study of European acquisitions, Campa and Hernando (2004) found bidders in domestic 
acquisitions to perform better in domestic than in cross-border acquisitions, although the 
difference is only significant for a long pre-announcement window. Aw and Chatterjee (2004) 
found similar results for UK firms. However, more recently Feito-Ruiz and Menendez-
Requejo (2011) studied 469 M&As of European listed firms (221 cross-border and 248 
domestic). They found that shareholders of acquiring firms place greater value on cross-
border M&A announcements than on domestic ones. Their results showed CAR of 1.38% for 
cross-border deals compared to 0.64% for domestic ones. 
 
Different from all prior research, which restricts analyses to either targets or bidders, or to 
focus purely on the difference between domestic and cross-border acquisitions without 
comparing cross-border acquisitions to similar domestic acquisitions,  Danbolt and Maciver 
performed the following research in 2012: They studied 251 cross-border targets (of which 
174 were targets in cross-border acquisitions into the UK and 77 were overseas targets 
acquired by the UK firms) and 146 cross-border bidders (81 in the UK and 65 overseas). Both 
bidders and targets were then matched to a similar company involved in a comparable 
domestic acquisition, with matching based on country, year, industry and size. 
 
Using this methodology they found both target and bidding company shareholders on average 
to earn significantly higher abnormal returns in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions. 
Additional gains for cross-border targets as compared to targets in similar domestic 
acquisitions amounted to a highly significant 10.1% CAR over a 3-day period centered on the 
day of the bid announcement. Besides the gains for target-firms, bidding companies also 
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perform better. While bidding companies in domestic acquisitions on average suffered 
negative abnormal returns of -1.8% CAR, returns to bidders in cross-border acquisitions are 
insignificantly different from zero with -0.3%, leading to a significant cross-border effect of 
1.5 percentage points.  As in previous research, gains generally accrued to target rather than to 
bidding company shareholders. Furthermore, Danbolt and Maciver (2012) found that cross-
border effects of both target and bidding company have been increasing over the last decades, 
with higher effects during the early 2000s as compared to the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
2.6 Critical Review 
 
With cross-border M&A increasing over the last three decades (World Bank 2014), so has the 
literature on cross-border M&A. However, academic research on this type of strategic action 
has not kept pace with the changes (Shimizu et al, 2004). Although, scholars have been 
conducting research on this topics for 30 years (Marks and Mirvis, 2011) there have only been 
modest improvements in the M&A success rate (Schoenberg, 2006).  
 
When reviewing previous research on cross-border M&A in the period 1998-2004, Campa 
and Hernando (2004) found that evidence on value-creation is evenly distributed between 
studies that report negative CAR and those that report zero and slightly positive CAR, while 
finding a positive significant CAR of 0.59 percent for acquiring firm‟s shareholders 
themselves. More recent studies show positive CAR in most cases (see Table 2.1). 
 
Research on cross-border M&A as being preferable to domestic M&A is also mixed. 
Although more recent studies (Feito-Ruiz and Menendex-Requejo, 2011; Kohli and Mann, 
2011; Danbolt and Maciver, 2012; Dutta et al., 2013) found evidence on excess value-
creation through cross-border M&A, others (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Stark and Wei, 2004; 
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Black et al., 2007) found the opposite to be true with cross-
border M&As failing to create excess value compared to domestic deals. The only study done 
so far on cross-border M&A by Dutch firms (Corhay and Tourani Rad, 2000) shows mixed 
results with small and insignificant negative CAR for the 40-day period before and after the 
announcement days in West European (-1,05) and East European acquisitions (-3,74), but 
positive and significant CAR in US acquisitions. However, on shorter time-periods closer to 
the announcement day differing results are found for all three areas (See Table 2.1). 
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Through this study we will try to contribute to the existing studies on value-creation through 
cross-border M&A and more specific form the basis for more research on Dutch-based cross-
border M&A which is still scarce.  
 
Factors affecting value-creation in cross-border M&A, another aspect we will be focusing on 
in this study, have also been thoroughly examined in the existing research, again with mixed 
results. Consensus seems to exist on hostile takeovers, diversification and the lack of deal 
transparency, firm size of the acquirer and the target, and amount of free cash. All of these 
were generally found to negatively affect value (Franks and Mayer, 1996; Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004; Bradley and Sundaram; 2004; Maquiera et al., 1998; Doukas et al., 2002; 
Martin and Sayrak, 2003; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011) (See Table 2.1). 
 
On other factors such as means of payment and legal status the evidence is more dispersed 
and less conclusive (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Eckbo et al., 
1990; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011; Bradley and Sundaram, 2004; Faccio et al., 2006). 
Studies trying to explain value-creation by including macroeconomic factors are also multiple 
(Datta and Puia, 1995; Markides and Ittner, 1994; Manzon et al., 1994), again providing 
mixed results (see Table 2.1). 
 
In a previous study on the Dutch M&A cross-border market, Corhay and Tourani Rad (2000) 
restricted their research to the moderating effect of size, industry relatedness and international 
exposure, without taking into account any macroeconomic factors which could possibly 
explain differences in value-creation across countries. Corhay and Tourani Rad (2000) found 
a negative effect of  -1.5% for companies already enjoying foreign exposure and a positive 
effect of diversification, contradicting the majority of existing research on diversification 
arguing the opposite, which is a negative effect on value-creation. They found no significant 
effect of deal size on value creation. 
 
No research has been done so far on differing macro-economic conditions between countries 
affecting cross-border acquisitions by Dutch companies. This is notable since it could be of 
significant relevance to practitioners in the field of M&A deciding on two similar deal 
opportunities arising in different countries. Taking this into account, the focus of this study 
will be on macroeconomic differences between countries affecting value-creation for bidding 
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shareholders. Macroeconomic factors we will be focusing on are national cultural differences, 
differences in tax rates and GDP growth. Besides this we will also investigate the effect of 
deal size, for which no significant effects were found in the study by Corhay and Tourani Rad 
(2000) as well as the method of payment and legal status on which the existing research has 
been relatively inconclusive compared to the other factors mentioned earlier. Lastly, we will 
also investigate industry relatedness. Although the existing research hints mostly to the idea 
unrelated diversification is value-destroying because it increases agency problems, the study 
by Corhay and Tourani Rad (2000) found the exact opposite to be true for Dutch firms.  
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2.6.1 Summary of Literature on Cross-Border Value Creation in M&A 
Table 2.1: Summary of Literature on cross-border M&A 
Year Author Period Market 
Sample Size 
(Domestic/C
ross Border) 
Event 
Window 
(days) 
CAR 
Acquirer 
Superior 
Performance 
(Domestic/Cross-
Border) 
Independent Factors found to 
explain value-creation 
 
1994 
 
Markides and Ittner 
 
1975-1988 
 
US 
 
NA/276 
 
[-1,0] 
[-1,+3] 
[-2,+3] 
 
 
0,32 
0,54 
0,49 
 
 
Cross-Border8 
 
Unrelated Diversification (-), Strength 
of Local Currency (+), Prior  
International Exposure (+), Acquirer 
Profitability (-), Advertisement 
Expenditure (+), Relative Size Target 
(+) 
1995 Datta and Puia 1978-1990 US NA/112 [-1,0] 
[-5,+5] 
[-15,+15] 
[-20,+20] 
-0,42 
-0,72 
-1,39 
-1,90 
N/A Cultural Distance (-) 
2000 Corhay and Tourani Rad 1990-1996 Dutch NA/111 [-40,+40]9 
[-5,+5]10 
[-5,+5]11 
[-5,+5]12 
4,83 
0,68* 
1,44 
-0,87* 
N/A Prior International Exposure (-), 
Unrelated Diversification (+) 
2000 Eckbo and Thorburn 1964-1983 Canada/US 1261/394 [-30,0] 
[0,+30] 
0,49* 
-0,17* 
Domestic Stock Financing of Deal (+), 
Relatively Smaller Equity Size Bidder 
(+) 
2004 Campa and Hernando 1998-2000 EU 182/80 [-30,+30] 0,56 Domestic Degree of Regulation (-) 
2004 Chari, Quimet, Tesar 1988-2003 US/Global NA/221 [-7+7] 1,79 N/A Acquisition of Majority Control (+) 
2004 Georgen and Renneboog 1993-2000 EU 142 [-1,0] 
[-2,+2] 
0,70 
1,18 
Domestic Hostile Bid (-) Stronger Effect of 
Stock Financing compared to Cash 
Financing, Market-to-Book Ratio (-) 
2004 Stark and Wei 1980-1998 US 5056/371 [-5,+5] 0,86 Domestic Corporate Governance Quality 
Acquirer‟s Country (+), Unrelated 
Diversification (-) 
2005 Moeller and 
Schlingemann 
1985-1995 US 4047/383 [-1,+1] 0,31 Domestic Shareholder Protection Target Country 
(+), Previous Takeover Activity in 
Target Country (+) 
2007 Black, Carnes, Jandik, 
Henderson 
1985-1995 US 1285/360 [-5+1] 
[-5+5] 
0,90 
1,50 
Domestic Accounting Data Value Relevancy (-) 
2008 Francis, Hasan, Sun 1990-2003 US 7612/1491 [-1+1] 0,96 Domestic14 Cost of Capital Acquirer (-) 
2011 Feito-Ruiz and 
Menendex-Requejo 
2002-2006 EU 248/221 [-1+1] 1,38 Cross-Border Legal and Institutional Environment 
Acquirer‟s Country (+) and Target 
Country (-), Size Acquirer (-), Relative 
Size Target (+), Listed Target (-) 
2011 Kohli and Mann 1997-2008 India 66/202 [-1,+1] 2,23 Cross-Border Size Acquiring Firm (-) 
2011 Martynova and 
Renneboog 
1993-2001 EU 1681/738 [-1,+1] 
[-5,+5] 
0,47 
0,84 
Domestic 
Cross-Border 
Deal Hostility (+) Legal Status Target 
is Privete/Non Public (+), Stock 
Financing of Deal (-)  
2012 Danbolt and Maciver 1980-2008 UK 397/397 [-1,+1] -0,3 Cross-Border Previous Takeover Activity in Target 
Country (+) 
2013 Dutta, Saadi, PenCheng 1993-2002 Canada 755/545 [-1,+1] 
[-2, +2] 
[-5+5] 
1,88 
2,34 
1,98 
Cross-Border Stock Financing of Deal (+), Amount 
of Combined Intangible Resources (+) 
8 Based on previous research by the same authors, 9+10 US target firms, 11 Western-European target firms, 12 Eastern-European target firms 
13 Between the periods 1990-1995 and 1996-2003 the cross-border CAR increased from 0,93 to 1,04, and the cross-border effect decreased from -0,47 to -0,30, evidencing a 
narrowing gap between domestic and cross-border value-creation. 
*not significant but relevant for our research based on the fact that we focus on Dutch-based Cross-Border M&A and this is the only study on the Dutch market.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Research Method 
 
In this section we will describe the common research methods used to assess value-creation in 
M&A and present and explain the reasoning for the method used in this study. 
 
3.1.1 Common Research Methods for Analyzing Value Creation 
 
Value creation in M&A can be measured using several different methods. Bild (1998) makes 
a distinction between the Incremental Cash Flow Method, Accounting Method, Interview 
Method and Market Method. The respective advantages and disadvantages of all four methods 
will be briefly discussed, as well as the choice for the method used in this study.  
 
Incremental Cash Flow Method 
To determine the value creation using the Incremental Cash Flow Method, the incremental 
cash flows created by the deal are transformed to a present value by a discount rate, which 
takes into consideration the risk of the incremental cash flows and the time value of money. 
To add value, these adjusted incremental cash flows need to exceed the purchase price for the 
target company. The return on invested capital can then serve as a measure of value creation 
(Halpern, 1983; Mueller, 1987). 
 
Accounting Method 
The Accounting Method derives the degree of success of a takeover by either using an 
absolute performance approach or a relative performance approach (Ikeda and Doi, 1983). In 
both these approaches different measures of accounting return are used, such as return on 
equity, return on assets, return on capital employed and return on sales.  
 
 
 
 
This chapter provides the reader with the methodological approach used, as well as 
hypotheses to be tested later in this study. 
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1. Absolute performance approach 
In this approach the accounting returns of the consolidated company are compared to the two 
merging companies had the deal not taken place. This means that an approximation needs to 
be made on how the merging parties would have done without the takeover (Bild 1998). 
 
2. Relative performance approach 
The relative performance approach compares the consolidated company‟s average 
performance to that of a control sample of similar companies that didn‟t participate in a 
merger. When using this approach, the control sample needs to be representative of the 
development that the merging companies might have faced in the absence of the takeover 
(Mueller, 1980; Cosh et al., 1980; Healey et al., 1992; Manson et al., 1994).  
 
Interview Method 
In the interview method, interviews take place with the merging firms‟ managers, who are 
asked whether the takeovers their companies participated in are viewed upon as successes or 
failures. These interviews take place some time after the event, when the implications of the 
decision have begun to appear (Bild, 1998). 
 
Market Method 
The Market Method is stooled on the hypothesis about efficient capital markets, which states 
that all prices fully reflect all relevant information, and that stock prices adjust 
instantaneously to new information. Provided that the market is efficient, the expected future 
benefits of a corporate acquisition should be fully reflected in the stock price at the first public 
announcement of the takeover, to the extent that they can be predicted (Mandelker, 1974; 
Langetieg, 1978). 
 
3.1.2 Method used in this Study 
 
Besides the advantages and disadvantages which can be identified in all four different 
methods, in our research we are first and foremost bound by the practical applicability of the 
different methods. Because of time constraints as well as the lack of access to internal 
company data, both the interview method, accounting method and incremental cash flow 
method are not feasible to execute in the given time for this thesis. For the latter, the 
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identification of the incremental cash flows and separating these particular incremental cash 
flows from other cash flows are very time consuming. 
 
Instead we will apply the market method in this thesis, which offers certain important 
advantages. First of all, the data is freely available and easily accessible through databases 
such as Thomson Reuters Eikon, Zephyr and DataStream. Because of the significantly 
reduced time constraint and easily accessible data, it is moreover possible to compare and 
contrast inter- and intra-industrial samples as well as national and international patters, both 
relevant in our study. A downside of this method is that our research will be restricted to 
publicly trading acquirer companies, since this method uses abnormal stock returns as a 
measure of success. 
 
 
3.2 Analytical Framework 
 
Our analysis is twofold. Firstly, we apply event study to check, whether our sample and sub-
samples of Dutch acquirers show significant value creation from cross border acquisitions. 
Secondly, we run regression analysis for different event windows to find out the influence of 
explanatory factors on shareholder value.  
 
3.2.1 Research Approach 
 
The research approach used in this thesis is a deductive approach (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
We will form hypotheses based on the literature on finance theory and from previous 
empirical studies. When reviewing theory and going through the empirical studies, it became 
clear to us that there is a research gap on the performance and determinants of cross-border 
acquisition by Dutch companies, therefore we aim to contribute to the research in this area.  
 
In this study, we want to research whether cross-border acquisitions create value for Dutch 
companies and assess the impact of some of the country-specific and deal-specific factors of 
cross-border acquisitions that possibly affect the value creation. To determine whether value 
is created and to find out the impact of the factors that influences acquirer companies‟ 
shareholder value, we will form hypotheses based on existing theories and see if those 
hypotheses apply to Dutch acquirer firms.  
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3.2.2 Event Study Methodology 
 
For this analysis, we are going to apply standard event study methodology to assess the 
impact of cross-border acquisition announcements on shareholder wealth. The assumption of 
event study is that the capital market accurately reflects the implication of the an announced 
event for the firm in question. In other words, event study assumes the market to be efficient 
at semi-strong level and assumes that the security prices adjust to new information quickly 
(Brown and Warner, 1980).  
 
The event of interest in our analysis is the announcement day of cross-border acquisitions. We 
define announcement day as the day when the press release is publicly available. Considering 
event study assumption holds, we will use the stock prices of individual companies as a 
measure of shareholder value and assess price reaction to the announcement (event) of cross-
border acquisitions.  
 
The logic of using event study on the acquisition announcement is best described by Linn and 
Rozeff (1984):  
 
“The immediate stock price reaction to an acquisition announcement can be regarded as 
conveying market perception of the long-run cash flow effects of the acquisition. That 
perception may not prove to be accurate, but it will be „unbiased‟- that is neither too high, nor 
too low on average.”   
 
Event window 
Next we have to identify the event window, which is defined as the period for which 
individual firm‟s stock prices will be analyzed. Research articles on M&A have used diverse 
sets of event windows, either short event windows, long event windows, or both. Short term 
indicates days or months around the announcement of the bid, while long term indicates 
months or years (Tuch and O‟ Sullivan, 2007). Short term event studies provided the most 
statistically significant results according to Andrade et al. (2001) and Markides and Ittner 
(1994). An advantage of a short term event window is that it is less likely to be affected by 
noise: Using a long term event window may make it harder to distinguish the impact of a 
particular acquisition deal from other company specific events (Tuch and O‟Sullivan, 2007). 
To increase the validity of our results, we would like to use multiple event windows. We 
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initially focused on multiple short term event windows, [-1,+1], [-3,+3], [-5,+5], covering 3, 7 
and 11 day event period, respectively, including the announcement day. However, such short 
event windows, though commonly used, may not capture the effect of acquisitions if there is 
bid speculation, information leakage prior to formal announcement or if market overreacts 
initially to the acquisition information and then subsequently adjusts to correct pricing 
(Danbolt and Maciver, 2012). Therefore, we also analyze stock prices over slightly longer 
periods of 21 and 41 days, i.e. event windows of [-10,+10] and [-20,+20] respectively.  
 
Abnormal Return 
To be able to assess what impact the event has on the stock price, we need to estimate the 
abnormal return. The abnormal return is the actual return subtracted by the normal return in 
the event window. Normal return is the expected return without the occurrence of the event 
(MacKinlay, 1997). The abnormal return for firm i at time t is:  
 
  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡 |𝑋𝑡)  
 
Where Rit is the actual return, 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡 |𝑋𝑡) is the expected or normal return for the time period t. 
 
In estimating the normal return, the assumption is that the security return is stable and linearly 
related to market return. That is why we use the market model to estimate normal return.   
Most event study methodologies used are based on the market model explained by Fama 
(1976). The Market model is used to calculate a firm‟s expected or normal return given 
historical linear relationship of the market return and the individual stock return (Markides 
and Ittner, 1994). The other alternative for estimating normal return is the Constant Mean 
Return Model (MacKinley 1997). It is a simple model which assumes that the mean return of 
a specific stock remains constant through time.  According to MacKinley (2007), the market 
model represents an improvement over the constant mean return model, because in the market 
model, by removing the portion of the stock return related to market return, the variance of 
abnormal return is reduced. This allows for an increase of the ability to identify any event 
impact. Because of this superior attribute, we will use the market model for estimating normal 
or expected return in our analysis. Normal return according to the market model is: 
 
Rit = αi + βi.Rmt + εit, 
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Where:          Rit = return on the stock of firm i at time t; 
Rmt = return on the market index at time t. In our study, we use the return on the 
Amsterdam Exchange index (AEX); 
αi and βi  = parameters of relationship between individual stock return and 
market return; and 
εit = residual of the relationship at time t¸ assumed to be normally distributed 
with a zero (0) mean, a constant variance over all values of Rmt (εit 
 ̰  i.i.d. N(0, 
s
2
)). 
 
The calculations of the normal return start with the calculation of the parameters- alpha (αi ) 
and beta (βi). We calculated both the parameters for each stock i for the period of -270 to -20 
trading days, being the estimation period which covers a full year of 250 trading days. For the 
model, we assume that the parameters remain constant during the estimation period and the 
event windows. We will use the parameters along with the benchmark (Rmt) to estimate 
expected return over the test period for each stock.  
 
Next we calculate the abnormal return (ARit), which is calculated by: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚𝑡 ), where 𝛼𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝑖  are estimated parameters of firm i. 
 
To draw inferences, we aggregate abnormal returns for each observation. When aggregating 
abnormal returns through time and across observations, we assume that there is no correlation 
among abnormal returns of different firms (Campbell et al., 1997). Abnormal returns are 
independent across observations when there is no overlap in event windows, according to 
Campbell et al. (1997). Therefore we excluded deals which had overlap in event windows. 
 
3.2.3 Significance Tests 
 
To attain the objective of this thesis and contribute to the research of cross-border acquisition, 
it is essential to test event study results to check their statistical significance. We will use the 
most commonly used test in similar studies which is the student’s t-test. We assume the 
abnormal returns to be independent, identically distributed and normal (Brown and Warner, 
1985) which is a requirement for the student‟s t-test. 
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3.3 Sample Selection 
 
For the analysis, the M&A data is collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon. To be included in 
the final sample, each cross-border acquisition announcement had to meet certain criteria. 
First of all, we chose all the deals by Dutch acquiring companies which are publicly listed for 
the purpose of event study. Then, we filtered out those cross-border deals which had disclosed 
value of deal size. Consequently, any deal that did not have a deal value in the database was 
excluded as we use relative deal size as a variable. At this point, we had 799 cross border 
M&A deals by publicly listed Dutch acquiring companies remaining in our sample. 
  
Afterwards, we removed deals which were relatively small compared to bidding firms. We 
excluded deals which comprised of less than 5% of the market capitalization of bidding firms. 
Market capitalizations 1-month prior to the announcement are chosen, which is in line with 
the work done by Conn et al. (2003) and Walker (2000) in which they exclude deals with 
sizes below 5% and 10% of the 3-month-prior and 1-month prior market capitalization 
respectively. Market capitalizations of the bidding firms are collected from Data Stream. 458 
deals had a size of below 5% of the value of the bidding firms; all these deals were excluded 
from the sample. In doing the above process, we found that Data Stream did not have market 
capitalization data 1-month prior to the announcement in the case of 57 deals, as some of the 
acquiring companies had insufficient trading history to have 1-month prior announcement 
value.  For this reason, those deals were excluded from the sample as well.  We also disregard 
cross-border deals made by companies in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) industry as 
their business model is based on acquiring real estate assets irrespective of industries they 
belong to, which is in conflict with our hypothesis of the unrelated diversification. Finally, 
another 25 deals were excluded, some of which because bidding firms had insufficient price 
data for the estimation period and the others because bidding firms had another deal being 
announced within same event window. Finally our sample was reduced to a number of 227 
clean observations of Dutch cross-border acquisitions from 20 target countries spanning 1984 
to 2014. 
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3.4 Dependent Variable 
 
As dependent variable in the multiple regression we will use Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR). Since we analyze five event windows, we will have five regression analyses where 
each event window has individual CARs for deals. As mentioned earlier, the event windows 
we will be analyzing are: [-1,+1], [-3,+3], [-5,+5], [-10,+10] and [-20,+20].  
 
The aggregate abnormal return for an event window [τ1, τ2] is referred to as the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR), which is calculated as: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝜏2
𝑡= 𝜏1
 
 
Apart from the regression, the CARs will be used to assess whether cross-border acquisition 
decision taken by Dutch companies have significant impact on their stock prices. Positive 
CARs imply that the stock market expects the cross-border acquisition to create shareholder 
value. Alternatively, negative CARs indicate that the acquisitions are expected to destroy 
value. 
 
Recent studies (Feito-Ruiz and Menendex-Requejo, 2011; Kohli and Mann, 2011; Danbolt 
and Maciver, 2012; Dutta et al., 2013) have found cross-border acquisitions to create 
significant value for acquiring firms. In line with these studies, we hypothesize that the cross-
border acquisition information can bring positive CAR for acquirers. 
 
Hypothesis 1: CAR is positive in cross-border acquisition 
  
Where          H0: CAR ≤ 0 
H1: CAR  > 0 
 
We will test abnormal returns and CAR with a one-sided t-test on different event windows, 
countries and regions. We will initially look at average abnormal return on each day from 20 
days before and after the announcement day for all deals. We will check the Dutch market 
reaction to cross-border acquisitions around the announcement day and test whether average 
abnormal returns are significantly positive by checking p-values of the averages.  
43 
 
 
To test the mean CAR, we will first calculate average CAR of all observation for each event 
window, for each individual country and for each individual sub-region. For the sample of N 
securities, the cumulative average abnormal return is estimated by: 
 
CAR(τ1, τ2) =
1
𝑁
 CAR i(τ1, τ2)
𝑁
𝑡=1
 
 
We will then calculate the standard deviation which is used in the calculation of the t-stat for 
the average CAR using the following formula (Markides and Ittner, 1994): 
 
𝑡 =
CAR(τ1, τ2)
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1 ,𝜏2)  𝑁 
 
 
where, SCARi (τ1,τ2) = standard deviation of the CARs, and N= number of deals in the sample. 
Subsequently we will calculate the probability or p-value for the corresponding t-statistic 
using Excel. We will check whether average CAR is significantly positive at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level. When significant for all event windows, we can then reject H0 and confirm that 
CAR is positive in cross-border acquisitions.  
 
3.5 Explanatory Variables 
 
 
We have selected a set of country-specific and deal-specific explanatory variables that we test 
in our regression analysis. In choosing explanatory variables for this study, our focus is 
mainly on the variables which were found to be significant in similar studies. We also include 
variables that other studies used, but did not find to be significant, but they are still used since 
this study is being applied on a different market. In addition, most studies mainly worked with 
target firms which are public. We wanted to see the impact of acquisition of both public and 
non-public target firms; as such we use those deal-specific variables from previous studies 
which are applicable to all target firms.   
 
The explanatory variables are described in the following section:   
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3.5.1 Country Specific Factors 
  
Cultural Difference:  
Cultural Difference is a proxy variable for the cultural distance between bidder and target 
country. As a measure of cultural fit, we will be using four cultural dimensions (Datta and 
Puia, 1995) identified by Hofstede (1980) which are: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, and masculinity/femininity. According to Datta and Puia (1995), the first 
dimension, power distance indicates the nature of distribution of power in the organization 
system; the second dimension, uncertainty avoidance is a measure of a country‟s intolerance 
level for ambiguity or uncertainty; the third dimension, individualism, relates to how a person 
perceives his or her relationship with collectivity or other people in the environment; lastly, 
the fourth dimension , masculinity/femininity, can be divided up in two parts. Masculinity 
refers to whether society is formed based on the values of competition, achievement and 
success. Femininity deals with the values of caring for others and quality of life, and regards 
quality of life as the sign of success (Hofstede, 1980). Following the methodology of Kogut 
and Singh (1988), we use Hofstede‟s (1980) index of four dimensions to form a composite 
index. The composite index takes into account the deviation along each of the four cultural 
dimensions for each target country from that of the Netherlands. The deviations were 
corrected for differences in the variances of each dimension and then were averaged by the 
number of dimensions used. The index used for this algebraically is as follows: 
  
𝐶𝐷𝑗 =  
 (Iij − Iin )
2/Vi 
4
4
𝑖=1
 
 
where, Iij  and Iin   =  index for i-th cultural dimension for j-th country (target), Vi is the 
variance of the index in the i-th dimension, n indicates the Netherlands, and CDj is the cultural 
difference of the j-th country from the Netherlands. 
 
We will use the value calculated by the above formula for each target country within our 
sample. The data for country-wise cultural dimension and differences with the Netherlands 
are included in the appendix (Appendix 1). Study by Datta and Puia (1995) has found an 
inverse relationship of cultural difference with shareholder return. We will assess that 
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hypothesis in our analysis both to see if there is an inverse relationship, and whether it is 
significant enough. 
 
Hypothesis 2: CAR is inversely related to cultural difference between target’s and acquirer’s 
country 
 
GDP Growth Difference between Target’s and Acquirer’s Country 
The GDP Growth difference consists of GDP Growth in the target‟s country minus the growth 
in GDP of the Netherlands. For GDP growth of the country of both target and bidder we take 
the average of GDP growth in the previous three years of the country prior to the 
announcement year. A positive number in this variable indicates that GDP in the target 
country is growing at a higher rate than that in the Netherlands. Doukas and Travlos (1988) 
found positive impact of this variable on value creation for US bidding firms, whereas 
Markides and Ittner (1994) used this variable in their study on international diversification on 
the same market, but found insignificant impact on CAR. We are going to apply this variable 
in our analysis of Dutch bidding firms and test if the positive difference in GDP growth 
between target and acquirer country provide significantly positive abnormal returns to the 
bidding firm.  
 
Hypothesis 3: CAR is positively related to the GDP growth difference between a target’s and 
acquirer’s country 
 
Tax Rate Difference  
Intuitively it can be said from the Imperfect Markets Theory (Madura, 2012) that if an 
acquirer takes over a company in a country with a lower tax rate, it will cause a wealth 
transfer of merger gains from the government entity to the merged firms. Scholes and 
Wolfson (1992) indicate however that the benefits from lower foreign taxes abroad are mainly 
illusory and argue that, in equilibrium, (risk-adjusted) after-tax returns in different countries 
should be equal. According to a study on US acquisitions by Manzon et al. (1994), 
investments in relatively high-tax countries earn normal after-tax returns because they earn 
higher pretax returns. The return is mainly generated from foreign tax credits (FTC) from 
repatriation of foreign income. Manzon et al. (1994) argued that repatriation of income from 
countries with a lower tax rate than US may attract further US tax, unless the parent company 
has foreign tax credits (FTC). Conversely, income repatriation from high tax countries will 
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generate excess FTCs rather than attracting additional taxes. We are assuming such FTCs 
from relatively high-tax rates in target country will have positive impact on the returns of the 
acquirer. So, for capturing the FTC, we take the difference in tax rates between the target and 
the Netherlands.  
 
Hypothesis 4: CAR is positively related to differences in tax rates between a target’s and 
acquirer’s country 
 
We obtained the tax information for different countries from the „paying taxes‟ database of 
the Easy of Doing Business project of the World Bank. We used the available data for overall 
taxes paid for doing business in a country, which includes corporate income tax, capital gain 
tax, labor tax, and vehicle and road taxes. 
 
3.5.2 Deal Specific Factors  
 
Corporate Control 
By corporate control, we indicate the ownership stake that the acquiring firm announces to 
acquire in the target firm. As a measure of corporate control, we will use information on the 
percentage acquired mentioned during the announcement of cross-border acquisition by 
Dutch firms. According to La Porta et al. (1998) majority ownership is acquired to shield the 
acquirer from the problem of weak investor protection. Chari et al. (2004) studied the impact 
of the acquisition of emerging market targets by developed market acquirers and found 
significant value creation coming from majority control. We want to test whether there are 
significant positive returns from having higher corporate control of the target firm in cross-
border acquisitions. 
 
Hypothesis 5: CAR is positively related to higher corporate control over the target firm 
 
Relative Deal Size 
Relative deal size is the value of the deal divided by the market value of the bidding firm. 
Feito-Ruiz and Menendex-Requejo (2011) found a positive relationship on abnormal returns 
and relative deal size when analyzing the European market. In line with this article and also 
since we are assuming cross-border acquisitions to produce positive abnormal returns, as 
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stated in an earlier hypothesis, we hypothesize that higher deal size (relative to market value 
of the bidder) leads to higher abnormal return for the bidder. 
 
Hypothesis 6: CAR is positively related to the relative deal size 
 
Method of Payment:  
Method of payment in the announced deal is a categorical variable in our analysis comprising 
of 3 categories: Only cash, only stock, and combined (both cash and stock). Here, one of three 
categories is to be chosen as control or reference group, as where for the other two categories 
dummy variables are to be defined (Ramanathan, 1997). We choose the combined payment 
category as our control or reference group. The regression coefficient of the two dummy 
variables will be used to compare whether each dummy‟s impact on CAR will be more or less 
than the control group. The two dummy variables for the other two payment categories will 
be:  
 
Cash =  
1      𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑕𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
Stock =  
1      𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑕𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
 
The deals with combined method of payment will take on the value of  0 in both only cash 
and only stock dummies.   
 
As discussed in the theoretical framework, different studies have found different impacts of 
choice of payment method on performance of the bidder firm. Eckbo et al. (1990) point out 
that all-cash payments require taxes on capital gains to be paid immediately by the target 
firm‟s shareholders. It is hypothesized that to compensate for this, bidders must raise the offer 
premium to compensate target shareholders for the tax penalty associated with this particular 
method of payment. For this reason, the market regards cash only deals as value destroying 
for bidders. Because of its inherent contingent pricing characteristics, stock-only offers can 
solve the problem of information asymmetry, another likely problem experienced in cash 
deals (Dutta et al., 2013). On the other hand, Hansen (1987) and Fishman (1989) suggest 
information asymmetry affects stock deals from the perspective of target firms. Given the two 
sided information asymmetry, Eckbo et al. (1990) explains that combined method of payment 
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represents an equilibrium solution and found such deals to outperform cash and stock deals 
after studying Canadian acquirers‟ performance. In line with the above result, we also assume 
deals with combined method of payment should have superior impact on CAR than deals with 
cash and stock payment.  
  
Hypothesis 7a): Deals with cash payment have lower CAR than deals with combination of 
cash and stock 
 
Hypothesis 7b): Deals with stock payment have lower CAR than deals with combination of 
cash and stock 
 
Unrelated Diversification:  
By unrelated diversification, we indicate whether the bidding firm acquires a firm belonging 
to an unrelated industry as compared to the bidder‟s operation. It is a categorical variable, and 
as such we use a dummy variable to account for its impact. The reference category is the 
related diversification. The dummy variable, unrelated diversification is defined as: 
 
UNRELATED =  
1   𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡′𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 ′𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑
  
 
As explained in 2.2.2 of Theoretical Framework, the theory of comparative advantage 
(Madura, 2012) suggests that firms can take advantages of technology or labor costs of 
specific countries and specialize by country to improve production efficiency. This advantage 
can be attained if the cross border acquisition is done within related industry. On the other 
hand, studies (Dos Santos et al., 2008; Maquiera et al., 1998; Doukas et al., 2002) have found 
unrelated cross-border acquisitions to destroy value, mainly caused by probable information 
asymmetry with the foreign target in an unrelated industry. On the other hand, Corhay and 
Tourani Rad (2000) in their study on Dutch cross-border acquisitions found the opposite 
result, having significantly positive value creation from unrelated diversification in a foreign 
country. Since the majority of the articles found a negative relation between value-creation 
and unrelated diversification, we are going to hypothesize the same. Since we are using a 
dummy variable, we assume that an acquisition of a foreign company in an unrelated industry 
will create less value for the acquirer as compared to a comparable acquisition in a related 
industry. 
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Hypothesis 8: Unrelated diversification deals have lower CAR than related diversification 
deals  
 
Legal Status of Target Company:  
Legal status of Target Company, i.e. whether the target is a public or private firm, can have an 
impact on the market performance of the acquiring company. Bradley and Sundaram (2004) 
found evidence of acquisitions of private targets leading to a decrease in takeover wealth for 
acquirers active in the US market. In their study they identified high information asymmetry 
coming from lower disclosure requirement for private firms as a possible explanation. We 
will test the alternative hypothesis in the Dutch scenario, checking whether acquiring a 
publicly trading target creates more value for acquirers‟ shareholders than private target firms. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Acquiring public firms bring higher CARs than acquiring non-public firms 
 
We use the information included in the Thomson Reuters Eikon database for the legal status 
of target firms. It is a categorical variable, so we use a dummy variable for this factor, where 
the reference category is the non-public target firms. 
 
PUBLIC =  
1   𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡′𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
0         𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
 
 
Table 3.1: Hypotheses Summarized 
Hypothesis   Description 
Hypothesis 1 CAR is positive in cross-border acquisition 
Hypothesis 2 CAR is inversely related to cultural difference between target‟s and acquirer‟s country 
Hypothesis 3 CAR is positively related to GDP growth difference between target and acquirer country 
Hypothesis 4 CAR is positively related to difference in tax rates between target‟s and acquirer‟s country 
Hypothesis 5 CAR is positively related to higher corporate control over the target firm 
Hypothesis 6 CAR is positively related to the relative deal size 
Hypothesis 7a) 
Hypothesis 7b)  
Deals with cash payment have lower CAR than deals with combination of cash and stock 
Deals with stock payment have lower CAR than deals with combination of cash and stock 
Hypothesis 8 Unrelated diversification deals have lower CAR than related diversification deals 
Hypothesis 9 Acquiring public firms bring higher CARs than acquiring non-public firms 
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3.6 The Regression Model 
 
We test the above mentioned factors of value creation upon dependent variable CAR for event 
window (τ1,τ1) using the following multiple regression model: 
  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 𝜏1, 𝜏2 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑈𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐷𝐼𝐹 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝐹
+ 𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 +  𝛽5𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾
+ 𝛽8𝑈𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖  
3.7 Data Collection  
 
As mentioned before, cross-border acquisition data was collected from Thomson Reuters 
Eikon and market price and value related data from Datastream. The data for the cultural 
dimensions of different countries are collected from the website of The Hofstede Centre. The 
data for GDP growth was collected from International Monetary Fund (IMF) World 
Economic Outlook Database for each country of concern. The tax rates for different countries 
were collected from historical data of the Ease of Doing Business project from the World 
Bank. Data for deal characteristics such as means of payment, acquirer‟s and target‟s industry 
and operation, legal status of target firms and percentage of target‟s ownership acquired were 
collected from the database of Thomson Reuters Eikon.  
 
3.8 Reliability and Validity 
 
3.8.1 Reliability 
 
Reliability is making sure that temporary or random differences in the sample do not 
influence the results. It is also about producing data in a consistent way over similar samples 
and anyone following the outlined steps should be able to replicate the same results or 
findings (Bryman & Bell, 2011). A high reliability in that sense means that the same results 
can be generated if the study would be repeated. To assess the reliability of our study two 
main aspects are considered: The reliability of the collected data and of the methods used. 
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Data was collected from the databases of Thomson Reuters Eikon and Datastream, both 
reliable sources of data and as a result used in a large amount of comparable studies in the 
fields of business, economics and finance. In those cases in which additional information was 
needed or information was unclear, the data from both these data bases was double checked 
with the source to prevent any errors. Since the firm specific information on both Thomson 
Reuters Eikon and Datastream originate from companies‟ external reporting, reliability is 
easily verifiable by going back to the source. Since we only included publicly listed firms in 
our study and these firms are required to provide their annual reports under IFRS or US 
GAAP regulations, the reliability of our data is once more increased. Furthermore the data for 
the cultural dimensions of different countries were collected from the website of The Hofstede 
Centre, data for GDP growth was collected from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
World Economic Outlook Database and the tax rates for different countries were collected 
from historical data of the Ease of Doing Business project from the World Bank. All of the 
latter being renowned and internationally acknowledged institutions or experts in their field 
(Hofstede), it is believed that the information provided through these sources are reliable. 
Since all this data could be automatically exported and did not need to be entered into excel 
manually, again reliability was ensured. All data has been automatically filtered out in Excel 
according to our described methodology, and all regressions were run by using the 
econometric software EViews. As such, the statistical calculations made on the in this thesis 
described sample should be correct and reliable. Since the selection procedure of the sample is 
clearly stated and outlined in this thesis‟ methodology, the study can be easily replicated in 
future research. 
 
3.8.2 Validity 
 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011), validity is the concern regarding the truthfulness of the 
conclusions which can be drawn from a research study. Validity is divided into four main 
classifications by the authors: measurement validity, internal validity, external validity, and 
ecological validity. As ecological validity only applies to questionnaire-based studies, we will 
not discuss it in the thesis. 
 
In a quantitative research, measurement validity is a very important concern (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011). A question to be raised regarding this validity is whether the study actually 
measures the research question in concern (Bryman and Bell, 2011). As the objective of this 
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study is to analyze the cross-border acquisition announcement effect on the shareholder value 
creation, a key question is how we measure shareholder value creation. We use event study 
methodology in our study, so we assume that the event (announcement) impact will be 
immediately reflected through the abnormal return of the stock of the acquirer firm. We 
estimate a normal return, which is the expected return without the event taking place 
(MacKinlay, 1997), based on the market model. We obtain the abnormal return of a stock 
from the difference between the actual and normal of the stock. As discussed before, the 
choice of market model over constant mean model was made to improve validity of the study 
(MacKinley, 2007). Moreover, the market model is a commonly used model in similar event 
studies (e.g. Brown and Warner, 1980; Markides and Ittner, 1994), which also impacted our 
decision.     
Internal validity refers to the causality in the relationship between two variables: x and y 
(independent and dependent variable) (Bryman and Bell, 2011). This validity raises the 
question whether it is valid to draw the conclusion that x causes variation in y, or that other 
variables can affect the relationship (Bryman and Bell, 2011). As mentioned earlier, the study 
assumes a semi-strong market efficiency (Fama, 1970) which means the price of a security 
reflects all publicly available information, e.g. the cross-border acquisition announcement. It 
is possible that events other than the acquisition announcement can affect stock price, and if 
that happens, our result may become invalid. However, the market model used in the study 
reduces the variation in the abnormal return by accounting for fluctuations of the market 
return which improves validity of our study. Moreover, we use five event windows in this 
study: [-1,+1], [-3,+3], [-5,+5], [-10,+10], and [-20,+20]. These windows are commonly used 
in similar studies (e.g. Datta and Puia, 1995; Feito-Ruiz and Menendex-Requejo, 2011; Dutta, 
Saadi, PenCheng, 2013). We mainly used the shorter event windows as the impact of the 
event will be larger in shorter periods (Andrade et al., 2001) and also because longer event 
windows increase the likelihood of other price-sensitive events (Tuch and O‟Sullivan, 2007).  
 
External validity refers to the representativeness of the sample, whether results can be 
generalized (Bryman and Bell, 2011). To ensure external validity in our study, it is important 
that the sample is representable for the Dutch market. Our method of sample selection is 
discussed under section 3.7.  
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4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter will first discuss the descriptive statistics, followed by empirical findings and 
analysis of those findings.  
 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this section the statistics of the sample used in this study will be discussed, and where 
relevant compared to the existing literature.  
 
Development Deal Frequency 
The amount of deals per year are found to be following the trend of M&A waves worldwide, 
with the fifth (1993-2000) and sixth (2003-2007) M&A wave (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2011) both clearly distinguishable in the graph in Figure 4.1. Out of the 227 deals from our 
sample, 68 deals (30%) took place in the period 1998-2000 (see Figure 4.1 and Appendix 6), 
the peak of the fifth merger wave.  
 
 
Distribution per Country and Region 
When looking at the distribution of Dutch M&A per country (See Table 4.1) it springs out 
that those countries with the closest geographical proximity to The Netherlands show a higher 
deal-total in comparison to those countries with a larger geographical proximity. This is in 
line with Di Giovanni (2005) and  Hijzen et al. (2008) who found that international 
investment decreases with distance. In addition to that finding, and in accordance with our 
data, Hijzen et al. (2008) found that a substantial amount of European firms acquire US firms 
Figure 4.1: Dutch Cross-Border M&A Deals in between 1984-2014 
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and vice versa. This explains the only exception to the theory on geographical proximity. 
Moreover, most deal activity in our sample takes place in Europe and North America which 
accounts for 96,04 percent of the total (See Table 4.2), a substantially higher percentage than 
the 70 percent found by Hijzen et al.  (2008).   
 
Table 4.1: Deals by Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Deals by Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Count Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
United States 76 33,5% 33,5% 
United Kingdom 40 17,6% 51,1% 
Germany 22 9,7% 60,8% 
Belgium 17 7,5% 68,3% 
France 13 5,7% 74,0% 
Sweden 9 4,0% 78,0% 
Switzerland 7 3,1% 81,1% 
Norway 6 2,6% 83,7% 
Canada 5 2,2% 85,9% 
Italy 5 2,2% 88,1% 
Spain 5 2,2% 90,3% 
Denmark 4 1,8% 92,1% 
Poland 4 1,8% 93,8% 
Australia 3 1,3% 95,2% 
Brazil 3 1,3% 96,5% 
Luxembourg 3 1,3% 97,8% 
China (PRC) 2 0,9% 98,7% 
Russia 1 0,4% 99,1% 
South Korea 1 0,4% 99,6% 
Turkey 1 0,4% 100,0% 
Total 227 100% 100,0% 
Region Count Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Western Europe 131 57,71% 57,71% 
North America 81 35,68% 93,39% 
Eastern Europe 6 2,64% 96,04% 
Australasia 3 1,32% 97,36% 
North Asia 3 1,32% 98,68% 
South America 3 1,32% 100,00% 
Total 227 100,00% 100,00% 
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Distribution per Industry 
The acquisitions in our sample took place in 44 different industries (See Table 4.3). When 
dividing up the acquisitions in our sample by industry it springs out that the more IT focused 
industries such as IT consulting & Services, Internet Software, Wireless and Other High 
Technology are underprestended in our sample, eventhough 30 percent of our sample consists 
out of M&A deals that took place during the Internet/High Tech Bubble which found its peak 
in the period 1998-2000, the peak of the fifth merger wave (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2011). Furthermore, the strong presence of Dutch companies in the Food and Beverage 
industry (CSM, Unilver, Heineken, Grolsch, Royal Dutch Ahold) leads it to be the leading 
industry when it comes to Dutch cross-border M&A. Lastly, all M&A in the Food & 
Beverage Retailing industry was performed by Royal Dutch Ahold. Over this entire period 
Royal Dutch Ahold was led by Dutch CEO Cees van der Hoeven, who‟s hubris led him to 
follow a path of acquisitions, eventually almost leading to the downfall of Royal Dutch Ahold 
(de Jong et al., 2007). 
 
Table 4.3: Frequency Distribution of Acquisition by Industry 
Industry Name Count Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
Food and Beverage 20 8,8% 8,8% 
Publishing 15 6,6% 15,4% 
Transportation & Infrastructure 14 6,2% 21,6% 
Insurance 13 5,7% 27,3% 
Chemicals 12 5,3% 32,6% 
Building/Construction 11 4,8% 37,4% 
Food & Beverage Retailing 9 4,0% 41,4% 
Machinery 9 4,0% 45,4% 
Other Consumer Products 9 4,0% 49,3% 
Metals & Mining 8 3,5% 52,9% 
Software 8 3,5% 56,4% 
Semiconductors 7 3,1% 59,5% 
Computers & Peripherals 6 2,6% 62,1% 
Oil & Gas 6 2,6% 64,8% 
Banks 5 2,2% 67,0% 
Discount and Department Store Retailing 5 2,2% 69,2% 
Employment Services 5 2,2% 71,4% 
Home Furnishings 5 2,2% 73,6% 
Pharmaceuticals 5 2,2% 75,8% 
Telecommunications Services 5 2,2% 78,0% 
Textiles & Apparel 5 2,2% 80,2% 
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Advertising & Marketing 4 1,8% 81,9% 
Electronics 4 1,8% 83,7% 
Other Industrials 4 1,8% 85,5% 
Paper & Forest Products 4 1,8% 87,2% 
Automobiles & Components 3 1,3% 88,5% 
Cable 3 1,3% 89,9% 
Brokerage 2 0,9% 90,7% 
Containers & Packaging 2 0,9% 91,6% 
Hotels and Lodging 2 0,9% 92,5% 
Motion Pictures / Audio Visual 2 0,9% 93,4% 
Other Real Estate 2 0,9% 94,3% 
Biotechnology 1 0,4% 94,7% 
Construction Materials 1 0,4% 95,2% 
Healthcare Equipment 1 0,4% 95,6% 
Healthcare Providers 1 0,4% 96,0% 
Household & Personal Products 1 0,4% 96,5% 
Internet Software 1 0,4% 96,9% 
IT Consulting & Services 1 0,4% 97,4% 
Other Financials 1 0,4% 97,8% 
Other High Technology 1 0,4% 98,2% 
Other Retailing 1 0,4% 98,7% 
Professional Services 1 0,4% 99,1% 
Real Estate Management 1 0,4% 99,6% 
Wireless 1 0,4% 100,0% 
Total 227 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Method of Payment 
The preferred payment method by Dutch acquirers is cash, with 70,5 percent of payments 
done in only cash (See Table 4.4). This number is only slightly different from the 63 percent 
found in outgoing Canadian cross-border deals in the period 1993-2002 (Dutta et al., 2013) 
and 77.4% of the outgoing cross-border deals in the UK (Danbolt and Maciver, 2012). 
Payment by stock only accounts for 7,0 percent (Canada: 10 percent, UK: 5.2 percent) with 
the remaining 22,5 percent  (Canada: 27 percent, UK: 17,4) paid in a combination of stock 
and cash. 
 
Table 4.4: Method of Payment 
 
 
 
Method of Payment: Count Percentage 
Only Cash 160 70.5% 
 Only Stock 16 7.0% 
Combined 51 22.5% 
Total  227 100.0% 
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Diversification 
Out of  all deals in our sample only 10.6 percent, or 24 out of 227 deals, concerns unrelated 
diversification (See Table 4.5). This seems to be in line with the majority of research on 
unrelated diversification which has found it to be value-destroying (Maquiera et al, 1998; 
Denis et al., 2002; Doukas et al., 2002; Martin and Sayrak, 2003, Moeller and Schlingemann, 
2005) . However, in a study on the European market by Martynova and Renneboog (2011) 
which covered the period 1993-2001,  a significantly higher 35.6 percent of M&A concerned 
unrelated diversification. 
 
Table 4.5: Type of Diversification 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Abnormal Return 
 
In this study we adopted the market mode to calculate abnormal returns. For 227 
observations, we calculated the average abnormal maximum 41 days of abnormal return, 
including 20 days before and after the announcement day (t) of each deal. We also calculated 
p-values from the T-statistic of the one-tailed t-test. The abnormal returns were significantly 
positive on t-9 and t-7 at the 1% and 5% level respectively, indicating probable leakage of 
acquisition information. The possibility of leakage is also supported by the significantly 
positive return on t-1 at the 5% level (See Figure 4.2 and Table 4.6). On the announcement 
day (t) and t+1, we found average abnormal returns of 0.75% and 1.05% respectively, 
significant at 5% and 1% level. On t and t+1, we see immediate reflection of acquisition news 
in the price, which is consistent with the premise of the efficient market hypothesis. 
Afterwards, we found that abnormal returns decrease, indicating a possible correction. It is 
evident as we can see significantly negative abnormal returns on t+3 at the 10% level. That is 
why it is important to look at market reaction few days after the announcement day as well 
(Danbolt and Maciver, 2012). The daily average abnormal returns for all observations within 
the 41, 21, 11, 7, and 3 day period are 0.08%, 0.17%, 0.21%, 0.31%, and 0.81%, which are 
significant at the 5%, 5%, 10%, 10%, and 5% level, respectively. This evidence suggests that 
Type of Diversification Count Percentage 
Related 203 89.4% 
Unrelated 24 10.6% 
Total 227 100.0% 
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daily average abnormal returns within different event windows are significantly positive, 
indicating that the Dutch market reacts positively to cross-border acquisitions in general.  
 
Figure 4.2:  Average Abnormal Returns before and after Announcement Day 
 
 
Table 4.6: Average Abnormal Returns before and after Announcement Day 
Day Average Abnormal Return p-value 
t-20 0.05% 0.3777 
t-19 -0.07% 0.3276 
t-18 -0.08% 0.2899 
t-17 0.32% 0.0128** 
t-16 -0.10% 0.2203 
t-15 -0.10% 0.1972 
t-14 0.06% 0.3348 
t-13 0.03% 0.4024 
t-12 0.06% 0.3680 
t-11 0.02% 0.4451 
t-10 0.17% 0.1183 
t-9 0.42% 0.0057* 
t-8 0.01% 0.4514 
t-7 0.39% 0.0298** 
t-6 0.00% 0.4890 
t-5 0.19% 0.1604 
t-4 -0.16% 0.1286 
t-3 0.10% 0.2811 
t-2 0.09% 0.2627 
t-1 0.64% 0.0472** 
t (announcement day) 0.75% 0.0108** 
t+1 1.05% 0.0050* 
t+2 -0.21% 0.1217 
t+3 -0.24% 0.0592*** 
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t+4 0.11% 0.2101 
t+5 0.00% 0.4954 
t+6 0.01% 0.4818 
t+7 0.45% 0.2101 
t+8 -0.03% 0.4268 
t+9 -0.10% 0.2532 
t+10 -0.10% 0.2367 
t+11 0.08% 0.2639 
t+12 -0.02% 0.4390 
t+13 -0.04% 0.3788 
t+14 0.10% 0.2872 
t+15 0.00% 0.4994 
t+16 -0.24% 0.0485** 
t+17 -0.08% 0.2875 
t+18 -0.02% 0.4269 
t+19 -0.15% 0.1506 
t+20 -0.03% 0.4092 
                        * Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% Level, ***Significant at 10% level 
 
4.3 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
We will be looking at the cumulative abnormal returns for different event periods in Table 4.7 
to test the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: CAR is positive in cross-border acquisition 
 
Table 4.7: CAR for Different Event Windows 
 
Event window 
CAR  
(-20,20) 
CAR 
(-10,10) 
CAR 
(-5,5) 
CAR 
(-3,3) 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
Average (%) 3.3151 3.5343 2.3012 2.1713 2.4389 
Std. Dev (%) 18.9091 16.1734 11.0750 10.1873 11.1707 
N 227 227 227 227 227 
T-stat 2.6415 3.2924 3.1306 3.2112 3.2894 
P-Value 0.0044* 0.0006* 0.0010* 0.0008* 0.0006* 
*significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 4.7 lists the average CAR for different event windows. In the table, we can see that 
average CAR for all the short event windows in our analysis is significantly positive. 
Consequently, the null hypothesis, H0: CAR ≤ 0, is rejected and it is confirmed that according 
to our study, cross-border acquisitions create value for Dutch acquirers.  
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Table 4.8 lists the CAR by country for the Dutch acquirers. This gives us a better picture of 
the countries from which acquisitions by Dutch firms create more value and vice versa. We 
had deals from 20 countries in our sample.  Of these countries, deals from the United States 
and United Kingdom comprised about 33% and 18% of the sample, respectively, followed by 
deals from Germany, comprising 10% of the sample.  
 
According to our results, acquisitions from the United States and Germany had significant 
positive CARs for all five event windows, at most at the 10% level. Consequently, it can be 
said that the Dutch market reacts positively to cross-border acquisitions in those two 
countries. Our result for United States is in line with what Corhay and Tourani Rad (2000) 
found in their study on Dutch acquirers studying the period 1990-1996. They found that 
acquisitions from United States generated significantly positive CAR in both the long and 
short event windows.  
 
Table 4.8: CAR by Country 
Country Deals 
 
CAR (-20,20) CAR(-10,10) CAR(-5,5) CAR(-3,3) 
 
CAR(-1,1) 
 
Australia 3 
Mean 0.3103 (11.2628) (15.6312) (11.8931) (8.4908) 
P- value 0.4830 0.2197 0.1819 0.2159 0.2579 
Belgium 17 
Mean 1.0063 (0.2214) 1.3491 0.6917 1.1602 
P- value 0.4006 0.4659 0.2190 0.3174 0.1635 
Brazil 3 
Mean (1.7414) (5.2857) (2.6275) (2.8583) (0.4810) 
P- value 0.3712 0.1405 0.1446 0.1434 0.4359 
Canada 5 
Mean (2.6965) 0.5668 2.6614 (0.7135) 0.4538 
P- value 0.2464 0.4472 0.1761 0.3900 0.4241 
China (PRC) 2 
Mean 80.1543 74.1501 10.9184 13.1429 28.6345 
P- value 0.2575 0.2732 0.2749 0.2565 0.2403 
Denmark 4 
Mean 5.9960 5.4434 3.9346 (0.4488) 3.5029 
P- value 0.2603 0.2216 0.3063 0.4366 0.2625 
France 13 
Mean 3.1145 2.1668 1.0837 1.7835 2.1452 
P- value 0.2724 0.3312 0.4096 0.3320 0.2339 
Germany 22 
Mean 3.6929 4.4785 3.8848 3.7685 2.4339 
P- value **0.0377 **0.0353 **0.0206 **0.0197 ***0.0527 
Italy 5 
Mean (0.3216) (1.9555) (0.5651) 0.8021 2.6566 
P- value 0.4522 0.2113 0.2853 0.2845 ***0.0908 
Luxembourg 3 
Mean (1.0765) 6.5663 8.9694 9.6937 9.2834 
P- value 0.4828 0.3193 0.2892 0.2244 0.2360 
Norway 6 
Mean 8.0495 7.8325 4.7957 2.2835 0.8059 
P- value 0.1431 **0.0491 0.1168 0.1115 0.2433 
Poland 4 Mean (8.0954) (0.6137) 0.4065 1.1638 3.8754 
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P- value **0.0340 0.4394 0.4417 0.3595 ***0.0936 
Russia 1 
Mean 3.9679 (0.3112) (0.0846) (0.1896) 0.0484 
P- value n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
South Korea 1 
Mean 6.8472 7.3480 5.0123 (0.4245) 4.1118 
P- value n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Spain 5 
Mean (1.8200) (2.8631) 0.9926 0.2514 0.3737 
P- value 0.2720 0.1536 0.2087 0.3974 0.4263 
Sweden 9 
Mean 15.5167 10.3138 10.2715 12.0223 15.6160 
P- value 0.1160 0.1752 0.1570 0.1305 0.1383 
Switzerland 7 
Mean 5.8609 7.7554 4.9989 4.5632 (0.8775) 
P- value 0.1687 ***0.0699 0.1256 0.1309 0.3559 
Turkey 1 
Mean (24.0059) (0.2402) 1.8968 (3.1265) 5.1746 
P- value n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
United 
Kingdom 
40 
Mean 1.6276 1.6110 2.2820 2.4676 2.6151 
P- value 0.2026 ***0.0681 **0.0143 *0.0011 *0.0001 
United States 76 
Mean 2.7975 3.9157 1.5631 1.4546 1.2389 
P- value ***0.0585 *0.0022 ***0.0865 ***0.0773 ***0.0883 
* Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% Level, ***Significant at 10% level 
 
Acquisitions in the United Kingdom brought positive CAR on all but one (-20,+20) event 
window.  In addition, deals from Switzerland, Italy, and Norway also had significantly 
positive CAR in one event window each, but since the sample size is small from these 
countries the results should be interpreted with caution as CAR may not be positive after all. 
 
Poland has a significantly negative return in (-20,+20) event window, but has significantly 
positive return in the (-1,+1) event window. Again, since the sample size from Poland is 
small, the result should be interpreted with caution. Belgium and France, having a sample size 
of more than 10, have mostly positive CARs, but these are not significant enough to conclude 
that these deals create value. The numbers of deals from other countries are small in our 
sample. Furthermore these deals have CARs which are not significant according to the found 
p-values. 
 
Looking at the CAR by regions in Table 4.9, average CAR is positive for deals from Western 
Europe and North America, at most at the 1% and 10% significance level, respectively in 
different event windows. This result is in line with Corhay and Tourani Rad (2000), who 
found that acquisitions from Western Europe generated significantly positive CAR for the 
event window (- 5, 0). Result from Eastern Europe was mixed at different event windows. 
This result also needs to be interpreted with caution due to its small sample size. Again, deals 
from other regions have a small sample size and generated insignificant CAR.  
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Table 4.9: CAR by Region 
Sub-region Deals   CAR (-20,20) CAR(-10,10) CAR(-5,5) CAR(-3,3) CAR(-1,1) 
Australasia 3 Mean 0.310 -11.263 -15.631 -11.893 -8.491 
  
 
P-value 0.483 0.220 0.182 0.216 0.258 
Eastern Europe 6 Mean -8.737 -0.501 0.573 0.223 3.454 
  
P-value **0.042 0.419 0.370 0.458 **0.042 
North America 81 Mean 2.458 3.709 1.631 1.321 1.190 
  
P-value ***0.073 *0.002 ***0.067 ***0.086 ***0.085 
North Asia 3 Mean 55.719 51.883 8.950 8.620 20.460 
  
 
P-value 0.206 0.220 0.181 0.222 0.182 
South America 3 Mean -1.741 -5.286 -2.628 -2.858 -0.481 
  
P-value 0.371 0.140 0.145 0.143 0.436 
Western Europe 131 Mean 3.381 3.045 3.166 3.076 3.069 
    P-value *0.010 *0.004 *0.001 *0.001 *0.002 
* Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% Level, ***Significant at 10% level 
 
4.4 Regression Results 
 
We ran the following regression for five event windows in our analysis: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 𝜏1, 𝜏2 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑈𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐷𝐼𝐹 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝐹
+ 𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 +  𝛽5𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾
+ 𝛽8𝑈𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖  
 
Table 4.10 below shows the results of five regressions combined. 
 
Table 4.10: OLS Regression for Different Event Windows 
Dependent Variable 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-3,+3) CAR (-5,+5) CAR (-10,+10) CAR (-20,+20) 
 
Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability 
C 3,0123 0,2501 3,2877 0,2300 5,0550 0,1118 1,8510 0,6967 -1,6040 0,7761 
CULTURALDIF 1,3102 0,1068 1,0946 0,1971 0,5753 0,5580 1,9129 0,1941 1,6073 0,3580 
GDPGROWTH 0,0023 0,9947 -0,5621 0,1242 -0,5395 0,2025 0,8152 0,1986 0,5271 0,4835 
TAXDIF 0,0429 0,6105 -0,0880 0,3179 -0,1119 0,2733 0,2797 0,0681 0,2892 0,1120 
CORPORATECONTROL -0,0262 0,0812 -0,0143 0,3625 -0,0151 0,4059 -0,0237 0,3834 -0,0208 0,5197 
RDEALSIZE 0,0486 0,0000 0,0366 0,0000 0,0335 0,0000 0,0368 0,0000 0,0440 0,0000 
CASH -2,9626 0,0382 -3,4220 0,0222 -3,6731 0,0341 -2,6472 0,3060 2,0492 0,5044 
STOCK -2,2363 0,3492 -2,2963 0,3579 -3,8307 0,1862 -2,3704 0,5844 -0,8394 0,8704 
UNRELATED 2,3917 0,1732 1,5744 0,3906 1,5450 0,4672 9,1784 0,0043 9,5450 0,0122 
PUBLIC -4,0360 0,0015 -3,4701 0,0088 -3,6265 0,0180 -4,5151 0,0488 -4,7211 0,0826 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 R-squared 0,5043 
 
0,3483 
 
0,2592 
 
0,2206 
 
0,1953 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0,4837   0,3213   0,2285   0,1883   0,1619   
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At first glance, we can see from the regression results that the regression which uses CAR on 
a shorter event window has more R
2
 or Adjusted R
2
. It supports our choice to use short event 
windows. It is consistent with the views of previous literature that short event periods are less 
likely to be affected by noise, and as such provide more significant results (Andrade et al., 
2001; Markides and Ittner, 1994; Tuch and O‟Sullivan, 2007). 
 
4.4.1 Testing Hypotheses on Explanatory Variables 
 
We will now test whether our hypotheses on explanatory variables hold for different 
regressions: 
 
Hypothesis 2: CAR is inversely related to cultural difference between target’s and acquirer’s 
country 
 
We did not find any evidence of the hypothesis that high cultural difference between a target‟s 
and acquirer‟s country (The Netherlands) negatively affects CAR or destroys acquirer value 
in cross-border acquisitions. Rather we found a positive relationship between CAR and 
CULTURALDIF, but those results were not significant. As discussed in the Theoretical 
Framework, the empirical results on the impact of cultural distance on value creation in cross-
border acquisitions are mostly mixed.  The fact that we found a positive relationship between 
CAR and CULTURALDIF, although not significant, is consistent with other studies (Kogut 
and Singh, 1988; Chakrabarti et al., 2009). We can also explain the positive nature of the 
relationship by looking at the data of cultural difference (Appendix 1) and CAR by country 
results from Table 4.3. We can see that CAR from countries such as Germany, United States 
and United Kingdom are more positive. The random selection of the sample based on our 
criteria, resulted in 61% of cross-border deals in our sample to take place in one these three 
countries. Taking into account that the cultural difference between the Netherlands and these 
three countries are smaller compared to most other countries in the sample conclusion on the 
impact of cultural difference on acquirers‟ shareholders value creation requires more target 
country-specific studies. 
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Hypothesis 3: CAR is positively related to GDP growth difference between target and 
acquirer country 
 
The results of the hypothesis that GDP growth difference between target and acquirer country 
positively affects CAR were not significant enough to draw conclusions. In regression 1, 4, 
and 5, we found positive coefficients, however coefficients were not significant enough. 
However, we found negative coefficients in the other two, also not significant though. As 
discussed before, Doukas and Travlos (1988) found significant impact of this variable on 
value creation for bidding firms‟ shareholders, but Markides and Ittner (1994) found 
insignificant impact. Apparently, the GDPGROWTH variable does not create value at a 
significant level for Dutch bidding firms‟ shareholders, which is in line with the conclusion of 
Markides and Ittner (1994). 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: CAR is positively related to differences in tax rates between target’s and 
acquirer’s country 
 
We found mixed results of the hypothesis that CAR is positively related to a tax rate 
difference between the target‟s and acquirer‟s country. In regression 4, we found that CAR (-
10,+10) is positively related to the TAXDIF, significant at the 10% level. According to the 
regression, the TAXDIF leads to a 0.28% increase in CAR (-10,+10) for Dutch companies, 
which supports our hypothesis and is also consistent with the conclusion drawn by Manzon et 
al. (1994) that higher taxation in target countries is value-creating for acquirers. But the 
relationship cannot be substantiated by regressions based on other event windows, as 
coefficients for this variable on other regressions are not significant. That is why the result for 
this variable should be interpreted with caution. 
 
 
Hypothesis 5: CAR is positively related to higher corporate control over the target firm 
 
In our analysis of Dutch bidding firms, we did not find any evidence that corporate control 
positively affects CAR. Rather we found that for regression 1, corporate control has negative 
relationship with CAR (-1,+1), which is significant at the 10% level. The coefficients of 
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CORPORATECONTROL for other regressions are not significant. That is why the results of 
this variable should be interpreted with caution. 
 
 
Hypothesis 6: CAR is positively related to the relative deal size 
 
We found significant evidence of the hypothesis that relative deal size positively affects value 
for Dutch acquirers. The coefficients of this variable are significant at the 1% level across all 
event windows, suggesting relatively larger cross border deals or targets creating more 
abnormal returns for acquirers. It is consistent with the study by Feito Ruiz and Menendex-
Requejo (2011) and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) who found similar results analyzing 
EU and US acquirers, and who argued that relatively larger deals lead to lower adverse 
selection problems. Given the results of the regression, we fail to reject the hypothesis that 
CAR is positively related to relative deal size. 
 
 
Hypothesis 7a): Deals with cash payment have lower CAR than deals with combination of 
cash and stock 
 
We have found some evidence of the hypothesis that cross-border deals with cash as method 
of payment have less impact on CAR than deals having combination of cash and stock as 
method of payment. Since CASH is a dummy variable, we compare this variable with the 
reference variable – combined method of payment, by the coefficient of CASH. We found 
that in regression 1, 2, and 3, CASH has a negative coefficient, all significant at the 5% level, 
suggesting that the impact of CASH on CAR is less than that for combined deals, which is 
consistent with our hypothesis and in line with the results by Eckbo et al. (1990). However, 
for regressions with the longer event windows (-10, +10) and (-20, +20), we found that the 
coefficients are not significant. It suggests that for slightly longer term event windows, impact 
of CASH deals and combined deals on CAR may not be different after all. So the results of 
this variable should be interpreted with caution.  
 
 
Hypothesis 7b): Deals with stock payment have lower CAR than deals with combination of 
cash and stock 
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We found that cross-border deals with stock as method of payment leads to underperformance 
of acquirers compared to deals with combination of cash and stock as the method of payment, 
but none of the coefficients were significant. For all the regression, we found that the 
coefficient of STOCK dummy variable is negative, which is consistent with our hypothesis 
and results by Eckbo et al. (1990). However, since none of the coefficients were significant 
enough, we fail to accept the assumed hypothesis. 
 
 
Hypothesis 8: Unrelated diversification deals have lower CAR than related diversification 
deals  
 
We did not find evidence of the hypothesis that unrelated diversification deals in cross border 
acquisitions have lower CAR than related diversification. Rather we found the opposite in 
regression 4 and 5, where we found unrelated diversification to create more value than related 
diversification for Dutch acquirers. This result is consistent with what Corhay and Tourani 
Rad (2000) found in their study on Dutch cross border acquisitions, in which they found 
significant evidence that unrelated diversification creates more value than related 
diversification. However, since most other studies on cross border acquisitions of developed 
countries have found unrelated diversification to have less value creation than related 
diversification, we hypothesized that this would apply to Dutch acquisitions as well. 
 
For other regressions focusing on smaller event windows, the coefficients of the variable 
UNRELATED were positive but not significant. Concluding, the impact of this variable on 
CAR should be interpreted with caution.  
 
 
Hypothesis 9: Acquiring public firms bring higher CARs than acquiring non-public firms 
 
For the hypothesis that acquiring public firms create more value than acquiring non-public 
firms, we found the totally opposite results from the hypothesis. For all the regression, we 
found the coefficients of the PUBLIC dummy variable to be significantly negative, suggesting 
that Dutch acquirers actually create less value by acquiring public firms than by acquiring 
non-public firms. Though this result is not consistent with our hypothesis that information 
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asymmetry in non-public firms is seen negatively by market, it is consistent with the 
conclusions of Faccio et al. (2006), who reasoned that acquirers create value from the 
illiquidity discount they receive from acquiring non-public firms. Also Martynova and 
Renneboog (2011) argued that market reacts positively to acquisition of non-public firm as 
takeover negotiations of such firms may have better chance of succeeding than acquisition of 
widely-held public firms for which a public tender offer needs to be made. Given the results 
and findings of other studies, we conclude that cross border acquisition of public firms create 
less value than acquisition of non-public firms for Dutch cross-border acquisitions. 
 
4.5 Diagnostic Testing 
 
In this section we will perform some diagnostic tests on results to find out whether any 
relevant OLS assumptions are violated and to check other problems exist with our data.   
 
Test of OLS Assumptions 
We will start by testing the appropriateness of relevant OLS assumptions for our regression 
analysis: 
 
Assumption 1: E (εi) = 0 i.e. average value of error term is 0.  
 
Since we have a constant intercept term included in the regression, this assumption is not 
violated (Brooks, 2008).  
 
Assumption 2: var (εi) = σ
2
 < ∞, i.e. variance of the errors, σ2, is constant.  
 
This is also known as assumption of Homoscedasticity (Brooks, 2008). If the error variance is 
not constant, we have the problem of heteroscedasticity. To test the heteroscedasticity, we 
apply White’s heteroscedasticity test in EViews (Brooks, 2008), which is a test with a null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity.  White’s cross product terms are not accounted for since we 
have a large number of variables given our sample size (Brooks, 2008). After running the test, 
we found evidence of heteroscedasticity for all the regression, identified by p-values of less 
than 1% for F-tests and chi-square tests. We included the test results for all 5 regressions in 
Appendix 2. To correct our regressions for heteroscedasticity we used White’s 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error estimates in EViews in estimating new regression 
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for our datasets (Brooks, 2008). The effect of using this correction is that standard errors for 
the slope coefficients increase relative to usual OLS standard errors, making hypothesis 
testing more „conservative‟ (Brooks, 2008).  
 
In Table 4.11, we show the 5 regression results of our analysis after the regressions were run 
using Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors: 
 
Table 4.11: Regressions taking into account  
White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
 
 
From the regression results, we find that R
2
 values and the slope of coefficients of the 
explanatory variables have remained the same as expected, but probability-values have 
changed. We will now discuss the variables, which had changes in the level of significance of 
the betas, from the original regression results:  
 
- The Tax Difference (TAXDIF) variable, which had significant beta on regression 4, is 
no longer significant on the regression. 
 
- The beta for the variable Corporate Control (CORPORATECONTROL) was 
significant at 10% level in regression 1, which is also no longer significant at that 
Dependent Variable 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
CAR (-1,+1) CAR (-3,+3) CAR (-5,+5) CAR (-10,+10) CAR (-20,+20) 
 
Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability 
C 3,0123 0,4366 3,2877 0,4280 5,0550 0,3317 1,8510 0,8128 -1,6040 0,8557 
CULTURALDIF 1,3102 0,1660 1,0946 0,2309 0,5753 0,6009 1,9129 0,4360 1,6073 0,5478 
GDPGROWTH 0,0023 0,9967 -0,5621 0,2024 -0,5395 0,2484 0,8152 0,5899 0,5271 0,7419 
TAXDIF 0,0429 0,7767 -0,0880 0,4687 -0,1119 0,4106 0,2797 0,4662 0,2892 0,4779 
CORPORATECONTROL -0,0262 0,1277 -0,0143 0,4879 -0,0151 0,5333 -0,0237 0,3880 -0,0208 0,5098 
RDEALSIZE 0,0486 0,0000 0,0366 0,0000 0,0335 0,0000 0,0368 0,0000 0,0440 0,0000 
CASH -2,9626 0,1131 -3,4220 0,1012 -3,6731 0,1382 -2,6472 0,3664 2,0492 0,5518 
STOCK -2,2363 0,3960 -2,2963 0,4380 -3,8307 0,2576 -2,3704 0,5893 -0,8394 0,8860 
UNRELATED 2,3917 0,3347 1,5744 0,4635 1,5450 0,5384 9,1784 0,0997 9,5450 0,1213 
PUBLIC -4,0360 0,0012 -3,4701 0,0173 -3,6265 0,0367 -4,5151 0,0209 -4,7211 0,0355 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 R-squared 0,5043 
 
0,3483 
 
0,2592 
 
0,2206 
 
0,1953 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0,4837   0,3213   0,2285   0,1883   0,1619   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Adjusted R-squared 0,4837   0,3213   0,2285   0,1883   0,1619   
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level. 
 
- The Dummy variable - CASH had significant beta at regression 1 3, but those results 
no longer hold. 
 
- The Dummy variable UNRELATED had a significant beta on regression 4 and 5. 
Now, its beta on regression 5 is no longer significant. 
  
 
The results of other variables almost remained unchanged from the original regression: 
 
- The Relative Deal Size (RDEALSIZE) variable still has significantly positive betas 
across all event windows, similar to the results of the original regression 
 
- The Dummy variable PUBLIC had significantly negative betas across all event 
windows in the original regression, which still prevails in the new regression. 
 
- The betas for CULTURALDIF and GDPGROWTH are still not significant. 
  
Interestingly enough, almost all variables which had varying levels of significance across 
different event windows in the original regression and interpretation, which was treated with 
caution, no longer had significant coefficient in the Heteroscedasticity- consistent regressions. 
This supports the validity of analyzing value-creation for multiple event windows.  
 
 Assumption 3: Explanatory variables are non-stochastic.  
 
This assumption is fulfilled if there is no correlation between the error term and the 
explanatory variables (Brooks, 2008). Appendix 3 shows the EViews results of the correlation 
coefficients. We found no correlation between the explanatory variables and residuals of the 5 
regressions. Because of this  it can be said that the explanatory variables in this analysis are 
non-stochastic.  
 
Assumption 4:  𝜖𝑡  ~ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎
2) i.e. The errors are normally distributed.  
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We can check normality assumption of errors by the Jarque-Bera test (Brooks, 2008). In 
Appendix 4, we put the results of the normality test run in EViews for each regression. The 
null hypothesis of the Jarque-Bera test is that of normality. According to the probability-
values of the test, the assumption of normality is rejected. As a consequence the distribution 
of error terms in the regressions is non-normal.  
We have a large sample size of 227 observations. According to Brooks (2008), violation of 
the normality assumption is virtually inconsequential for sample sizes that are sufficiently 
large. It derives this argument from the central limit theorem, suggesting that for large 
samples, test statistic will asymptotically follow the appropriate distributions even in the 
absence of error normality. As a result, we decide to not correct the variables for the non-
normality. Furthermore, according to Brooks (2008) it is quite common that few extreme error 
terms cause a rejection of the normality assumption, which is the case in our results as well, as 
evidenced by the histograms of normality tests shown in Appendix 4. 
 
Test of Multi-collinearity 
 
The implicit assumption of using OLS estimates is that explanatory variables are not 
correlated with each other (Brooks, 2008).  If they are not correlated, adding or removing a 
variable from the regression equation would not cause a change in the coefficient values on 
other variables. If explanatory variables are highly correlated, the problem of multi-
collinearity occurs, which causes high R
2
 and individual coefficients to have high standard 
errors. And regression becomes sensitive to small changes in specification, so removing or 
adding an independent variable causes large change in coefficients or significance of other 
variables (Brooks, 2008)  
 
In Appendix 5, we include the correlation matrix of the independent variables. From the 
results, we see that none of the correlation coefficients are higher (lower) than 0.8 (-0.8), a 
rule of thumb for measuring multi-collinearity. As a result we can conclude that multi-
collinearity problem does not exist in our model.  
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This chapter presents concluding remarks and offers possibilities for further research  
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
This study is the outcome of the identification of a research gap on the analysis of value 
addition to Dutch acquirers from cross border acquisition. The primary objective of this study 
was to assess whether cross-border acquisitions create value for acquiring companies based in 
the Netherlands. For this assessment, we used event study methodology on a sample of 227 
acquisition deals by publicly listed Dutch firms from 20 countries during the years 1984 to 
2014. As a proxy for shareholder value creation, we looked at average cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) for different short-term event windows and found significantly positive CAR 
across selected event windows. The results suggest that cross-border acquisitions generally 
create value for the Dutch acquirers. In the process, evidence was found of the validity of 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) in the cross border announcement case of Dutch market. 
Looking at the source of value-creation from a country level perspective, we found evidence 
that value is mainly created from acquiring targets based in Germany, United States, and 
United Kingdom. We also looked at acquisitions from a regional perspective and found 
positive value creation from acquisitions of companies based in North America and Western 
Europe. Our results are in line with an existing, but outdated study on Dutch cross-border 
acquisitions which also found evidence of value creation in acquisitions of target firms from 
North America and Western Europe. For the other countries or regions in our sample, either 
no significant CARs were found, or were interpreted with caution because of their small 
sample size despite significant CARs.  
 
The other objective of this study was to find out what factor(s) affect the value creation in 
cross border acquisition scenario. In our attempt to identify variables that affect value 
creation, we chose several country-specific and deal-specific variables and formed hypothesis 
about the impact of each variable on CAR based on previous empirical results and theories. 
The multiple linear regression was applied using the independent variables on CAR of 
different event windows. The results from the regression analysis for the independent 
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variables were mixed in our study. In the original regression and Heteroscedasticity-consistent 
regression analyses, we found evidence that larger deals relative to the size of acquirers 
positively affect the shareholder value of Dutch firms in cross-border acquisitions, which is in 
line with the results of some existing empirical studies. It also suggests that the Dutch market 
assumes that the acquirers can generate more synergies from relatively bigger cross border 
deals. Furthermore, we found evidence that the legal status of the target firms also has 
significant impact on the acquirer value. In that, we assessed that market attributes less value 
addition to the acquisitions of public foreign firms than acquisition of non-public foreign 
firms. Apart from these two variables, the regressions showed some variables (unrelated, cash 
dummy variable, tax difference, corporate control) to have significant impact on CAR across 
one or few event windows, but not across all event windows. As such, we prefer to be 
cautious in the interpretation of these variables. And we did not find the rest of the variables 
such as - cultural difference, GDP growth difference, and stock dummy variable, to have 
significant impact on the CAR. 
 
In conclusion, we believe that this study will provide the audience, especially the practitioners 
of publicly-traded Dutch companies, a useful insight into the impact of cross border 
acquisition on shareholder value of Dutch acquirers.  
 
 
 5.2 Recommendations for Further Research 
 
A large number of studies exist on value creation through M&A, with studies focusing on 
cross-border M&A increasing over the last couple of years. A majority of these studies also 
search for determinants which can be used to explain stronger or weaker value-creation. 
Through this study we have tried to contribute to this large amount of existing literature. 
However, there are still many interesting questions left to be answered. 
 
First of all, our study focused on Dutch cross-border M&A with the aim of finding those 
countries in which Dutch M&A creates an above average return for its bidder‟s shareholders. 
It would be interesting to focus on those countries, US, Germany, and United Kingdom, and 
compare them to the other countries in our sample to try and explain for differences which 
can account for different levels of value-creation.  
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Secondly our study focused on value-creation for acquirer‟s shareholders in Dutch outgoing 
cross-border M&A. We didn‟t look at value creation for target‟s shareholders in incoming 
Dutch-cross border M&A. it would be interesting to see if the same good fit (US and 
Germany) exists for incoming as well as outgoing M&A 
 
Thirdly, based on previous research, we only focused on eight possible determinants of value-
creation expecting those to be most relevant and leaving a lot of determinants unused. Further 
research should be used to examine other possible determinants of value-creation with a focus 
on macroeconomic factors such as relative cost-of-labour per country, investor protection, 
political climate, language, degree of openness to foreign investment, relative inflation and 
more.  
 
Fourthly, our study focuses on the Dutch cross-border M&A market, but comparable studies 
could be done for other country-specific markets to find optimal target-countries. Most of the 
existing research still focuses on the US, UK, Japan and China although cross-border M&A is 
increasing in magnitude and relevance, and as such more research should be performed.  
 
Lastly, these suggestions are non-exhaustive and the possibilities, scope and range for future 
research are extensive. 
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Appendix 2:  Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
Regression 1: CAR (-1,+1) 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 6.955071    Prob. F(9,217) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 50.82057    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 241.8670    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/25/14   Time: 18:18   
Sample: 1 227    
Included observations: 227   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 116.1524 74.09920 1.567526 0.1184 
CULTURALDIF^2 -4.266068 3.568593 -1.195448 0.2332 
GDPGROWTH^2 7.542270 4.420246 1.706301 0.0894 
TAXDIF^2 0.245888 0.154357 1.592982 0.1126 
CORPORATECONTROL^2 -0.004664 0.003687 -1.265040 0.2072 
RDEALSIZE^2 0.000121 0.000106 1.133642 0.2582 
CASH^2 -39.39930 38.91877 -1.012347 0.3125 
STOCK^2 -27.35262 47.32375 -0.577989 0.5639 
UNRELATED^2 71.44837 54.85803 1.302423 0.1942 
PUBLIC^2 -38.99494 26.61106 -1.465366 0.1443 
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Regression 2: CAR (-3,+3) 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 2.683512    Prob. F(9,217) 0.0056 
Obs*R-squared 22.73431    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0068 
Scaled explained SS 87.05313    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/25/14   Time: 18:21   
Sample: 1 227    
Included observations: 227   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 253.0256 113.2865 2.233503 0.0265 
CULTURALDIF^2 -8.174181 4.326098 -1.889504 0.0602 
GDPGROWTH^2 3.603559 2.167271 1.662717 0.0978 
TAXDIF^2 0.053234 0.102301 0.520365 0.6033 
CORPORATECONTROL^2 -0.009250 0.005547 -1.667616 0.0968 
RDEALSIZE^2 1.86E-05 5.45E-05 0.341717 0.7329 
CASH^2 -87.22783 57.65166 -1.513015 0.1317 
STOCK^2 -70.20252 71.52483 -0.981513 0.3274 
UNRELATED^2 29.46644 61.01172 0.482964 0.6296 
PUBLIC^2 -84.90894 40.42432 -2.100442 0.0368 
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Regression 3: CAR (-5,+5) 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 2.883304    Prob. F(9,217) 0.0031 
Obs*R-squared 24.24612    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0039 
Scaled explained SS 95.46002    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/25/14   Time: 18:23   
Sample: 1 227    
Included observations: 227   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 386.0730 160.8522 2.400172 0.0172 
CULTURALDIF^2 -15.71885 6.214358 -2.529440 0.0121 
GDPGROWTH^2 5.000167 2.460460 2.032208 0.0434 
TAXDIF^2 0.040574 0.139989 0.289836 0.7722 
CORPORATECONTROL^2 -0.012996 0.007773 -1.671804 0.0960 
RDEALSIZE^2 -1.74E-05 4.96E-05 -0.351340 0.7257 
CASH^2 -132.2060 81.73977 -1.617401 0.1072 
STOCK^2 -127.9211 95.95435 -1.333145 0.1839 
UNRELATED^2 40.25369 83.03782 0.484763 0.6283 
PUBLIC^2 -126.8042 57.51237 -2.204816 0.0285 
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Regression 4: CAR (-10,+10) 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 26.01419    Prob. F(9,217) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 117.8092    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 1348.023    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/25/14   Time: 18:24   
Sample: 1 227    
Included observations: 227   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -135.7097 290.8632 -0.466576 0.6413 
CULTURALDIF^2 6.456263 20.42302 0.316127 0.7522 
GDPGROWTH^2 63.57419 37.73460 1.684772 0.0935 
TAXDIF^2 2.258712 1.269274 1.779530 0.0766 
CORPORATECONTROL^2 -0.006665 0.010477 -0.636195 0.5253 
RDEALSIZE^2 -8.90E-06 0.000111 -0.080197 0.9362 
CASH^2 50.60877 124.4378 0.406699 0.6846 
STOCK^2 57.95397 170.2071 0.340491 0.7338 
UNRELATED^2 416.4306 244.8842 1.700521 0.0905 
PUBLIC^2 -20.89714 86.21823 -0.242375 0.8087 
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Regression 5: CAR (-20,+20) 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 22.48858    Prob. F(9,217) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 109.5481    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 769.0681    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/25/14   Time: 18:25   
Sample: 1 227    
Included observations: 227   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -92.81419 321.0877 -0.289062 0.7728 
CULTURALDIF^2 0.599642 21.89612 0.027386 0.9782 
GDPGROWTH^2 69.49323 42.94866 1.618053 0.1071 
TAXDIF^2 2.445047 1.451546 1.684443 0.0935 
CORPORATECONTROL^2 -0.000902 0.011150 -0.080851 0.9356 
RDEALSIZE^2 -1.32E-05 0.000142 -0.093294 0.9258 
CASH^2 29.85171 139.5210 0.213958 0.8308 
STOCK^2 143.3279 225.0191 0.636959 0.5248 
UNRELATED^2 489.1638 280.1759 1.745916 0.0822 
PUBLIC^2 -13.74405 92.54702 -0.148509 0.8821 
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Appendix 3: Correlation Coefficients of Regression Residuals and Explanatory 
Variables 
 
Correlation Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
Probability RESID01 RESID02 RESID03 RESID04 RESID05 
      
CULTURALDIF  -7.52E-16 -8.10E-16 -3.26E-16 -5.29E-16 -1.74E-16 
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
      
GDPGROWTH  9.73E-18 8.61E-17 5.92E-17 -2.14E-17 1.58E-16 
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
      
TAXDIF  3.33E-17 6.82E-17 1.41E-16 -1.05E-17 5.73E-17 
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
      
CORPORATECONTROL  -4.71E-17 3.86E-17 2.11E-16 1.11E-17 -3.74E-17 
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
      
RDEALSIZE  5.33E-17 -6.37E-17 2.80E-16 1.54E-16 4.94E-17 
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
      
CASH  1.05E-16 1.67E-17 1.01E-16 -3.77E-33 4.87E-17 
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
      
STOCK  1.07E-17 -2.24E-17 1.93E-17 1.29E-17 7.23E-18 
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
      
UNRELATED  1.30E-17 4.34E-17 8.03E-18 -2.86E-17 2.41E-17 
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
      
PUBLIC  1.49E-17 3.27E-17 -1.41E-17 5.88E-17 1.58E-17 
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Appendix 4: Normality test 
 
Regression 1: 
0
10
20
30
40
50
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
Series: Residuals
Sample 1 227
Observations 227
Mean      -7.04e-17
Median  -0.207169
Maximum  40.73953
Minimum -41.08980
Std. Dev.   7.864921
Skewness   0.335245
Kurtosis   11.41596
Jarque-Bera  674.1703
Probability  0.000000
 
 
Regression 2 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
Series: Residuals
Sample 1 227
Observations 227
Mean      -6.43e-16
Median  -0.158084
Maximum  42.13256
Minimum -38.40666
Std. Dev.   8.224009
Skewness   0.520193
Kurtosis   9.380402
Jarque-Bera  395.2820
Probability  0.000000
 
 
Regression 3 
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Series: Residuals
Sample 1 227
Observations 227
Mean       6.55e-16
Median   0.198789
Maximum  50.40753
Minimum -44.98162
Std. Dev.   9.532023
Skewness   0.465895
Kurtosis   9.616710
Jarque-Bera  422.3059
Probability  0.000000
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Regression 4 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Series: Residuals
Sample 1 227
Observations 227
Mean      -3.17e-16
Median   0.413272
Maximum  122.0284
Minimum -37.33024
Std. Dev.   14.27849
Skewness   2.855604
Kurtosis   26.04265
Jarque-Bera  5330.541
Probability  0.000000
 
 
Regression 5 
0
10
20
30
40
50
-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Series: Residuals
Sample 1 227
Observations 227
Mean       7.08e-16
Median   0.129184
Maximum  127.9358
Minimum -44.08641
Std. Dev.   16.96220
Skewness   1.813801
Kurtosis   16.36464
Jarque-Bera  1813.853
Probability  0.000000
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables  
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Appendix 6: Acquisition Frequency Distribution by Year 
 
Announcement Year No. of Acquisitions Announced Percentage of Total 
1984 1 0.4% 
1986 2 0.9% 
1987 2 0.9% 
1988 1 0.4% 
1989 7 3.1% 
1990 9 4.0% 
1991 8 3.5% 
1992 5 2.2% 
1993 4 1.8% 
1994 8 3.5% 
1995 5 2.2% 
1996 9 4.0% 
1997 7 3.1% 
1998 11 4.8% 
1999 28 12.3% 
2000 29 12.8% 
2001 3 1.3% 
2002 6 2.6% 
2003 6 2.6% 
2004 7 3.1% 
2005 11 4.8% 
2006 9 4.0% 
2007 14 6.2% 
2008 6 2.6% 
2009 4 1.8% 
2010 8 3.5% 
2011 6 2.6% 
2012 8 3.5% 
2013 2 0.9% 
2014 1 0.4% 
Total 227 100.0% 
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Appendix 7: The Final Sample of Cross Border Deals 
 
 
# Acquirer Name Target Name Target Nation Announcement 
Date 
Deal Size 
(Eur mn) 
1 Hagemeyer NV Pacific Dunlop Ltd-Electrical Distribution 
Business 
Australia 1/Aug/00 213.9 
2 Hagemeyer NV Techpac Holdings Ltd Australia 13/Jun/03 27.1 
3 Trader Classified Media NV Trading Post Group Pty Ltd Australia 1/Oct/02 58.9 
4 ABN-AMRO Holding NV Generale de Banque SA Belgium 26/May/98 11086.1 
5 CSM NV Continental Sweets(Gilde Buy- Out 
Fund,AXA Private Equity Fund) 
Belgium 12/Sep/00 110.4 
6 Equant NV Global One Co-Corporate Data Services 
Businesses 
Belgium 20/Nov/00 3071.0 
7 Gamma Holding NV De Witte Lietaer Belgium 23/Feb/90 47.6 
8 ING Groep NV Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA Belgium 11/Nov/97 3916.0 
9 Internationale Nederlanden Groep 
NV 
Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA Belgium 10/Sep/92 1297.8 
10 Koninklijke KPN NV KPN Orange Belgium NV (Koninklijke 
KPN NV) 
Belgium 14/Dec/00 957.9 
11 Koninklijke Vendex KBB NV Brico Belgium SA(GIB Group SA) Belgium 27/Mar/02 505.3 
12 Koninklijke Vendex KBB NV Leroy Merlin-DIY Business, Belgium Belgium 17/Apr/03 65.1 
13 Krasnapolsky Hotels & Restaurants 
NV 
European Hotel Ventures Belgium SC-
Hotels, Belgium and Netherlands (6) 
Belgium 25/May/99 22.6 
14 Krasnapolsky Hotels & Restaurants 
NV 
Alfa Hotels Management NV, Alfa 
International Hotels NV 
Belgium 13/Sep/99 18.3 
15 Macintosh Retail Group NV Brantano NV Belgium 29/Oct/07 159.7 
16 Petroplus International NV Nynas Petroleum-Antwerp Bitumen 
Refinery 
Belgium 19/Nov/02 21.7 
17 Sensata Technologies Holding NV Sensor-Nite NV Belgium 15/Jun/11 223.2 
18 Smit Internationale NV URS Belgie NV Belgium 31/Dec/07 181.9 
19 United Services Group NV Solvus NV Belgium 15/Jun/05 688.7 
20 Vilenzo International NV Tricotop BV Belgium 14/Aug/01 15.6 
21 ABN-AMRO Holding NV Banco Real SA Brazil 8/Jul/98 1948.8 
22 Koninklijke DSM NV Tortuga Cia Zootecnica Agraria Brazil 8/Aug/12 490.4 
23 Mittal Steel Co NV Arcelor Brasil SA Brazil 2/Aug/06 4392.5 
24 AMG Advanced Metallurgical 
Group NV 
Timminco Ltd Canada 27/Jan/09 15.2 
25 Delft Instruments NV Oncology Software Solutions Canada 11/Feb/03 21.5 
26 Exact Holding NV Longview Solutions Inc Canada 17/Sep/07 36.1 
27 Koninklijke DSM NV Ocean Nutrition Canada Ltd Canada 18/May/12 415.0 
28 Nutreco Holding NV Maple Leaf Foods Inc- Maple Leaf Animal 
Nutrition 
Canada 21/May/07 342.6 
29 Elephant Talk Communications Inc Beijing Chinawind Communications 
Information Technology Co 
China (PRC) 4/Jan/06 4.1 
30 Trader Classified Media NV SouFun Holdings Ltd China (PRC) 13/Jul/05 140.6 
31 Axa Stenman Industries NV Basta Group A/S Denmark 20/Jan/00 12.9 
32 Grontmij NV Carl Bro Gruppen A/S Denmark 12/Jul/06 168.7 
33 Koninklijke Ten Cate NV Roshield A/S Denmark 7/Dec/06 34.6 
34 Madge Networks NV Olicom A/S-Token Ring Business Denmark 31/Aug/99 14.2 
35 Corporate Express NV Lyreco SAS France 21/May/08 1718.7 
36 Delft Instruments NV Auxitrol Systems & Sensors (Auxitrol 
Technologies SA) 
France 8/Nov/02 6.9 
37 Endemol Holding NV Endemol France SAS France 9/Jan/07 450.7 
38 Gucci Group NV Sanofi Beaute(Artemis SA) France 28/May/99 923.8 
39 ING Groep NV Credit Commercial de France {CCF} France 10/Dec/99 8374.7 
40 McGregor Fashion Group NV Gaastra Europe SARL France 16/Oct/00 3.5 
41 Nedgraphics Holding BV Info Design France 11/Jan/99 4.3 
42 Pakhoed Holding NV Lambert Riviere SA France 5/Dec/94 35.8 
43 Royal Wessanen NV Distriborg Groupe France 7/Jul/00 95.9 
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44 TKH Group NV CAE Groupe France 20/Jul/07 75.2 
45 Unit 4 Agresso NV Risc Technology France 22/Jun/04 14.9 
46 Vendex International NV BIS SA France 6/Jan/97 221.9 
47 VIA NET.WORKS Inc Amen SAS France 28/Jan/04 5.6 
48 Ahrend Groep NV(Buhrmann- 
Tetterode NV) 
Gwinner & Ulrich Fertigungs GmbH Germany 29/Nov/94 8.9 
49 Akzo Nobel NV Hoechst Roussel Vet(Hoechst AG) Germany 11/Aug/99 667.0 
50 Benckiser NV(Joh A Benckiser 
GmbH) 
Benckiser Marken GmbH & Co (Joh A 
Benckiser GmbH) 
Germany 27/Jul/99 183.5 
51 Brack Capital Properties NV Undisclosed Property Co Germany 19/Jul/12 29.4 
52 Gamma Holding NV Verseidag AG Germany 1/Dec/98 228.2 
53 Gemalto NV Cinterion Wireless Modules GmbH Germany 29/Jun/10 163.4 
54 Hagemeyer NV(First Pacific 
Davies/First Pacific Co Ltd) 
J Froeschl & Co Germany 11/Jun/91 61.3 
55 Hollandsche Beton Groep NV Wayss und Freytag AG(AGIV AG fuer 
Industrie und Verkehrswesen) 
Germany 30/Dec/96 136.5 
56 ICTS International NV ICTS-GmbH(ICTS International NV) Germany 1/Jul/97 3.5 
57 ING Groep NV Berliner Handels und Frankfurter Bank 
KGaA 
Germany 13/Aug/99 2212.3 
58 Koninklijke Ahrend NV Mauser Waldeck AG Germany 24/Feb/00 28.1 
59 Koninklijke Grolsch NV Wickueler Group Germany 31/Jan/91 34.3 
60 Koninklijke KNP BT NV Wilhelm Seiler,Bunzl Italia (Bunzl PLC) Germany 24/Dec/96 82.5 
61 Koninklijke KPN NV E-Plus Mobilfunk GmbH(Otelo 
Communications GmbH) 
Germany 10/Dec/99 2915.2 
62 Mediq NV Assist GmbH Germany 9/Nov/11 95.0 
63 Oce-van der Grinten NV Hochleistungsdrucke HLD (Siemens 
Nixdorf Informationssy) 
Germany 15/Feb/96 427.2 
64 Rood Testhouse International NV Microtec GmbH Germany 4/Jul/08 3.2 
65 Samas NV Schaerf AG Germany 2/Mar/95 126.8 
66 Samas NV Schaerf AG (Samas-Groep NV) Germany 18/May/98 14.6 
67 Telegraaf Media Groep NV ProSiebenSat1 Media AG Germany 1/Jun/07 437.5 
68 USG People NV Allgeier DL GmbH Germany 21/Feb/08 174.4 
69 Versatel Telecom International NV Versatel Deutschland Holding GmbH Germany 16/Aug/04 20.3 
70 CSM NV Socalbe(Cie Industriali Riunite SpA) Italy 11/Apr/01 132.2 
71 Koninklijke Numico NV Mellin SpA Italy 28/Feb/05 398.5 
72 VimpelCom Ltd Weather Investments Srl Italy 4/Oct/10 16359.2 
73 Vistaprint NV Pixartprinting Srl Italy 1/Apr/14 137.0 
74 Wolters Kluwer NV Ipsoa SpA(Isvim SpA/Ferruzzi Finanziaria 
SpA) 
Italy 26/Apr/91 141.1 
75 Mittal Steel Co NV Arcelor SA Luxembourg 27/Jan/06 32516.8 
76 Omnium Europe Financiere de Developpement Regional 
SA 
Luxembourg 10/Jan/91 6.4 
77 United Pan-Europe 
Communications NV 
SBS Broadcasting SA Luxembourg 9/Mar/00 2201.2 
78 Aegon NV Vital Forsikring A/S Norway 3/May/95 314.6 
79 Apothekers Cooperatie OPG UA Norsk Medisinaldepot AS (Norway) Norway 15/Mar/99 23.8 
80 Buhrmann NV Andvord Tybring-Gjedde ASA Norway 29/Aug/06 269.7 
81 EVC International NV Norsk Hydro AS-Petrochemicals Division Norway 7/Jul/98 107.3 
82 Fugro NV Exploration Resources ASA Norway 15/Aug/05 241.0 
83 Nutreco Holding NV Hydro Seafoods(Norsk Hydro 
A/S/Norway) 
Norway 13/Mar/00 464.4 
84 Apothekers Cooperatie OPG UA Orfe SA(Orphe Holdings Ltd) Poland 10/Jun/99 20.0 
85 GTC Real Estate BV Globe Trade Centre SA Poland 11/Oct/05 76.7 
86 New World Resources NV Lubelski Wegiel "Bogdanka" SA Poland 5/Oct/10 801.3 
87 UNIT4 NV Teta SA Poland 9/Jul/10 44.3 
88 Heineken NV Ivan Taranov Breweries Russia 17/Aug/05 455.1 
89 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV LG Electronics Co Ltd-Active Matrix 
Liquid Crystal Display 
South Korea 17/May/99 1498.8 
90 Heineken Holding NV Cruz del Campo SA(Guinness PLC) Spain 10/Jun/99 870.4 
91 Heineken NV Cruz del Campo SA Spain 9/May/90 945.5 
92 Heineken NV El Aguila SA(Heineken NV) Spain 10/Aug/94 86.8 
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93 Koninklijke Ahold NV Superdiplo SA Spain 7/Sep/00 1302.0 
94 Roto Smeets Group BV Quebecor World Europe Holding Spain 7/Nov/07 239.3 
95 Akzo NV Nobel Industrier Sweden AB 
(Securum/Nordbanken/Sweden) 
Sweden 8/Nov/93 2791.9 
96 Draka Holding NV ABB Cables AB,ABB Norsk Kabel (ABB 
Asea Brown Boveri Ltd) 
Sweden 16/Nov/99 203.7 
97 Koninklijke Ahold NV ICA Group Sweden 10/Dec/99 1797.5 
98 Koninklijke Ahold NV ICA AB Sweden 19/Jul/04 835.6 
99 LBI International NV LBI International AB Sweden 25/Feb/10 110.9 
100 Royal Imtech NV NVS Installation AB Sweden 4/Nov/08 236.0 
101 Royal Imtech NV Narkes Elektriska AB Sweden 23/Jun/10 102.9 
102 Spyker Cars NV Saab Automobile AB Sweden 26/Jan/10 685.0 
103 Wolters Kluwer NV Liber AB Sweden 15/Jan/93 161.8 
104 BE Semiconductor Industries NV Oerlikon Assembly Equipment AG Switzerland 26/Jan/09 4.6 
105 Crucell NV Berna Biotech AG Switzerland 1/Dec/05 320.2 
106 Cryo-Save Group NV Salveo Biotechnology SA-Cord Blood 
Preservation Assets 
Switzerland 24/Dec/13 0.7 
107 DSM NV Roche Holding AG-Vitamins & Fine 
Chemicals Business 
Switzerland 3/Sep/02 1921.3 
108 Fugro NV GeoTeam A/S-Core Businesses (Petroleum 
Geo-Services A/S) 
Switzerland 9/Feb/94 26.8 
109 Gucci Group NV Severin Montres Switzerland 25/Nov/97 94.1 
110 Petroplus International NV Royal Dutch/Shell Group- Cressier 
Refinery 
Switzerland 14/Jul/99 128.3 
111 Wavin NV Pilsa Plastik Sanayi AS Turkey 22/Nov/07 55.2 
112 Aalberts Industries NV IMI PLC-Copper Fittings Business United Kingdom 22/Jul/02 102.3 
113 Aalberts Industries NV Senior Heat Treatment Ltd,Traitement 
Thermique Iberique SAS 
United Kingdom 5/May/99 37.5 
114 Aalberts Industries NV Pegler Holdings Ltd United Kingdom 26/Aug/05 58.4 
115 Accell Group NV Raleigh Cycle Ltd United Kingdom 26/Apr/12 59.7 
116 Aegon NV AEGON Scottish Equitable PLC United Kingdom 21/Dec/95 378.7 
117 Akzo Nobel NV Imperial Chemical Industries PLC{ICI} United Kingdom 18/Jun/07 11726.3 
118 Akzo Nobel NV Courtaulds PLC United Kingdom 17/Apr/98 3454.1 
119 Atag Holding NV Dawes Cycles Ltd United Kingdom 23/Apr/90 3.9 
120 Draka Holding NV Delta PLC-Remaining Cables Businesses United Kingdom 2/Mar/99 32.9 
121 Elsevier NV Pergamon Press PLC(Maxwell 
Communication Corp PLC) 
United Kingdom 28/Mar/91 613.5 
122 Eriks Group NV Wyko Investments Ltd United Kingdom 17/Oct/06 385.2 
123 Fugro NV Thales GeoSolutions Group Ltd United Kingdom 17/Jul/03 156.5 
124 Gamma Holding NV Arthur Sanderson & Sons Ltd (West Point-
Pepperell Inc) 
United Kingdom 10/Apr/90 74.7 
125 Hagemeyer NV WF Electrical PLC United Kingdom 13/Jun/00 189.4 
126 Hagemeyer NV(First Pacific 
Davies/First Pacific Co Ltd) 
Newey & Eyre Group Ltd(ABN AMRO 
Holdings NV,Hagemeyer NV) 
United Kingdom 18/Jan/94 35.6 
127 Hollandsche Beton Groep NV Kyle Stewart Ltd United Kingdom 2/Aug/89 55.3 
128 Hollandsche Beton Groep NV GA Holdings Ltd United Kingdom 10/Jul/92 18.8 
129 Internationale Nederlanden Groep 
NV 
Barings PLC-Assets United Kingdom 3/Mar/95 822.7 
130 Koninklijke BolsWessanen NV Telford Foods,H & C Cereales in 
Faverolles(Harrisons & Crosfield PLC) 
United Kingdom 17/Aug/94 101.6 
131 Koninklijke Grolsch NV Ruddles Brewery Ltd(Courage Ltd/Foster's 
Brewing Group) 
United Kingdom 17/Jan/92 59.2 
132 Koninklijke Nedlloyd Groep NV Blue Star Line Ltd-Container Shipping 
Business 
United Kingdom 9/Feb/98 90.8 
133 Koninklijke Vopak NV Ellis & Everard PLC United Kingdom 10/Nov/00 588.3 
134 Madge Networks NV Gains International (CI) Ltd United Kingdom 8/Feb/99 40.9 
135 Medicopharma NV Macarthy PLC-Wholesaling Division United Kingdom 10/Aug/90 25.2 
136 Nutreco Holding NV Marine Harvest McConnell (Booker PLC) United Kingdom 1/Aug/99 49.5 
137 Pakhoed Holding NV Tees Storage Co, Gebr Broere BV 
Dordrecht (Tenneco Inc) 
United Kingdom 22/Jan/88 96.1 
138 Pakhoed Holding NV Panocean Storage & Transport Ltd(Ocean 
Group PLC) 
United Kingdom 25/Feb/92 60.2 
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139 Petroplus International NV Phillips-Imperial Petroleum 
Ltd(ICI,Phillips Petroleum Co Inc) 
United Kingdom 13/Dec/00 48.0 
140 PolyGram NV(Philips Electronics) Propaganda Films,Working Title United Kingdom 24/Sep/91 154.5 
141 Rood Testhouse International NV MTL Microtechnology(Cambridge 
Electronic Industries) 
United Kingdom 31/Jul/89 1.7 
142 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co Shell Transport & Trading Co PLC United Kingdom 28/Oct/04 69803.6 
143 Royal Imtech NV Meica Group Ltd United Kingdom 19/Aug/03 26.2 
144 Samas NV VF International Limited (Vickers PLC) United Kingdom 23/Jul/90 85.5 
145 Smit Internationale NV Land & Marine Engineering Ltd (Costain 
Group PLC) 
United Kingdom 16/Aug/96 13.1 
146 Spyker Cars NV Midland F1 Ltd United Kingdom 9/Sep/06 84.5 
147 Unit 4 Agresso NV CODA PLC United Kingdom 14/Jan/08 205.0 
148 United Pan-Europe 
Communications NV 
Telewest Communications PLC United Kingdom 26/Jun/00 3667.7 
149 Van der Moolen Holding NV Curvalue Financial Services Group United Kingdom 27/May/05 59.0 
150 VRG-Groep NV(Koninklijke 
Nederlandse Papierfabrieken NV) 
Systems Reliability Holdings PLC-
Corporate Computers 
United Kingdom 13/Sep/90 17.2 
151 Wienerberger Finance Service B.V. Baggeridge Brick PLC United Kingdom 17/Aug/06 146.2 
152 Aalberts Industries NV Amcast Industrial Corp-Certain Flow 
Control Division Assets 
United States 9/Jul/04 43.6 
153 ABN-AMRO Holding NV Standard Federal Bancorp,Troy, Michigan United States 22/Nov/96 1517.4 
154 ABN-AMRO Holding NV Michigan National Corp (National 
Austraila Bank Ltd) 
United States 23/Nov/00 3265.7 
155 ABN-AMRO Holding NV Cragin Financial Corp United States 6/Jul/93 425.4 
156 Aegon NV Providian Corp-Insurance Operations United States 27/Dec/96 2081.4 
157 Aegon NV TransAmerica Corp United States 18/Feb/99 8635.7 
158 AerCap Holdings NV International Lease Finance Corp United States 16/Dec/13 3949.4 
159 Akzo NV Stauffer Chemicals-Speciality Chemical 
Business (Imperial Chem Inds PLC) 
United States 22/Jun/87 525.1 
160 Akzo NV Reliance Universal Inc(Tyler Corp) United States 19/Apr/89 232.3 
161 Akzo NV FRP Company-Paper Chemical 
Activities(Monsanto Co) 
United States 3/Nov/86 184.8 
162 AMEV NV(Fortis AG) Western Life Insurance Co, St Paul 
Advisors Inc(St Paul Cos) 
United States 27/Sep/84 174.1 
163 AMG Advanced Metallurgical 
Group NV 
KB Alloys LLC United States 21/Feb/11 17.6 
164 Arcadis NV Malcolm Pirnie Inc United States 25/Jun/09 158.9 
165 ASM International NV NuTool Inc United States 2/Mar/04 47.2 
166 ASM Lithography Holding NV Silicon Valley Group Inc United States 29/Sep/00 1670.2 
167 ASML Holding NV Cymer Inc United States 17/Oct/12 1785.7 
168 BAAN Co NV Aurum Software Inc United States 13/May/97 189.9 
169 Bateman Litwin BV Delta-T Corp United States 17/Jul/07 37.7 
170 BE Semiconductor Industries NV RD Automation United States 2/Sep/00 24.4 
171 Centrale Suiker Maatschappij 
NV{CSM} 
Westco Products Inc United States 16/Jul/92 103.1 
172 Chicago Bridge & Iron Co NV Howe-Baker International Inc (Wedge 
Group Inc) 
United States 31/Jul/00 155.4 
173 Chicago Bridge & Iron Co NV The Shaw Group Inc United States 30/Jul/12 2609.0 
174 Chicago Bridge & Iron Co NV ABB Lummus Global Inc United States 27/Aug/07 696.4 
175 CSM NV CarPro Inc United States 8/Jan/03 290.7 
176 DSM NV Catalytica Pharmaceuticals Inc (Catalytica 
Inc) 
United States 2/Aug/00 875.4 
177 Fuel Tech NV Nalco Fuel Tech(American Bailey 
Corp,Fuel Tech NV) 
United States 2/Sep/99 9.3 
178 Getronics NV Wang Laboratories Inc United States 4/May/99 1544.0 
179 Hagemeyer NV Vallen Corp United States 15/Nov/99 190.2 
180 HCS Technology NV Savin Corp(Colorocs Corp) United States 28/Jul/89 24.8 
181 HCS Technology NV Colorocs Corp United States 28/Apr/89 21.3 
182 HCS Technology NV Savin Corp(Colorocs Corp) United States 28/Jul/89 13.7 
183 ING Groep NV ReliaStar Financial Corp United States 28/Apr/00 5458.1 
184 ING Groep NV Aetna Inc-Financial Services & 
International Businesses 
United States 20/Jul/00 5335.9 
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185 ING Groep NV Equitable of Iowa Cos United States 8/Jul/97 1991.7 
186 Koninklijke Ahold NV Stop & Shop Cos United States 28/Mar/96 2340.5 
187 Koninklijke Ahold NV US Foodservice Inc United States 8/Mar/00 3604.2 
188 Koninklijke Ahold NV Tops Markets LLC United States 27/Feb/91 316.6 
189 Koninklijke Ahold NV Giant Food Inc United States 19/May/98 2438.5 
190 Koninklijke Ahold NV Alliant Exchange Inc(Clayton Dubilier & 
Rice Inc) 
United States 4/Sep/01 2469.7 
191 Koninklijke Ahold NV Pathmark Stores Inc United States 9/Mar/99 1607.3 
192 Koninklijke Bijenkorf Beheer 
(DNU>6/30/99) 
FAO Schwarz United States 31/Jul/90 36.0 
193 Koninklijke DSM NV Fortitech Inc United States 8/Nov/12 498.2 
194 Koninklijke KNP BT NV BT Office Products International 
Inc(Buhrmann- Tetterode NV) 
United States 22/Jan/98 126.9 
195 Koninklijke Luchtvaart 
Maatschappij NV{KLM} 
Hilton International Co (Transworld Corp) United States 18/Dec/86 880.2 
196 Koninklijke Luchtvaart 
Maatschappij NV{KLM} 
Northwest Airlines Corp United States 14/Sep/94 142.8 
197 Koninklijke Numico NV General Nutrition Cos Inc United States 5/Jul/99 2488.5 
198 Koninklijke Numico NV Rexall Sundown Inc United States 1/May/00 1923.2 
199 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV Respironics Inc United States 21/Dec/07 3532.7 
200 LBI International NV Mr Youth United States 14/Nov/11 36.7 
201 Oce NV Imagistics International Inc United States 15/Sep/05 585.2 
202 Oce-van der Grinten NV AM International Inc-Bruning Division United States 1/Aug/91 42.3 
203 OPG Groep NV Byram Healthcare Centers Inc United States 19/Feb/08 89.5 
204 Pakhoed Holding NV Univar Corp United States 3/Jun/96 410.5 
205 Pharming Group NV ProBio Inc United States 28/Nov/00 9.4 
206 Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken NV North American Philips Corp (Philips 
Gloeilampenfabrieken NV) 
United States 17/Aug/87 648.9 
207 PolyGram NV(Philips Electronics) Motown Records(Boston Ventures) United States 3/Aug/93 261.5 
208 Qiagen NV Digene Corp United States 3/Jun/07 988.9 
209 Randstad Holding NV Strategix Solutions Inc United States 27/Aug/98 784.9 
210 Randstad Holding NV SFN Group Inc United States 20/Jul/11 514.2 
211 Royal Dutch Shell PLC East Resources Inc United States 28/May/10 3811.4 
212 Sarakreek Holding NV Eastern Realty Investment Corp United States 20/Sep/96 143.9 
213 Smartrac NV Millennium Card's Technology Ltd United States 5/Nov/09 8.7 
214 Tornier NV OrthoHelix Surgical Designs Inc United States 24/Aug/12 148.6 
215 Unilever NV Slim-Fast Foods Co United States 12/Apr/00 2401.1 
216 Van der Moolen Holding NV Lawrence O'Donnell Marcus LLC United States 25/Jun/98 137.5 
217 Vedior NV ACSYS Inc United States 17/Apr/00 118.3 
218 Vistaprint NV Webs Inc United States 19/Dec/11 90.6 
219 VNU NV IMS Health Inc United States 10/Jul/05 5788.8 
220 VNU NV ITT World Directories Inc (ITT Corp) United States 18/Dec/97 1897.2 
221 VNU NV Nielsen Media Research Inc United States 16/Aug/99 2641.7 
222 VNU NV ACNielsen Corp United States 18/Dec/00 2612.2 
223 VNU NV BPI Communications Inc United States 14/Jan/94 196.5 
224 VNU NV Miller Freeman Inc United States 18/Jul/00 697.2 
225 VRG-Groep NV(Koninklijke 
Nederlandse Papierfabrieken NV) 
VGC Corp United States 18/Apr/89 26.9 
226 Wolters Kluwer NV Commerce Clearing House Inc United States 27/Nov/95 1372.1 
227 Wolters Kluwer NV JB Lippincott United States 21/May/90 189.0 
 
